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Abstract 
  In my dissertation I examine the value of publicly provided goods in a spatial setting, and 
investigate the scope of government in providing an excludable public good. The thesis uses GIS 
software to create original data sets to study urban spatial issues. The main goal of the thesis is to 
value public goods in a spatial context as it is important to policy makers concerned with 
development of urban areas.  Protected open space is found to be valuable to home owners, and 
distance to open space is important to the magnitude of the value.  Homeowners have a weak 
valuation for being close to public schooling, and distance has a small impact on the magnitude of 
the value.  
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       Ownership Regime for Excludable Public Good 
Introduction 
Recently governments have used different organizational structures to provide public services.  
Governments have contracted more frequently with private firms to provide public services and in some cases for 
the private firm to own the facility.    The most often cited example of privatization is that of prisons in which a 
private firm runs the daily prison service.  In one form of provision the government contracts out the building but 
provides the service and retains ownership.  In another case referred to as a public-private partnership, the 
government contracts out the construction and service provision to a private firm and the private firm retains 
ownership.  This practice of moving the provision from the government to the private sector is referred to as 
privatization.   
Previous research on privatization has focused on pure public projects when modeling the appropriate 
boundary between a private and a public firm.  The objective of this paper is to model the optimal provision and 
ownership regime of a project which is non-rival but excludable.  The project has a dual role: it is used by the 
government to provide a pure public service, and by consumers for individual consumption.  The introduction of a 
private market to the issue of privatization changes the problem but also requires an explicit model of demand 
which the privatization literature does not have.  This paper will show the conditions which play an important role 
in determining the provision and ownership regime chosen for the project. 
 The introduction of citywide wireless networks across the U.S. motivates this line of research.  From July 
2005 to December 2006, the cities with networks increased from 38 to 79, and cities with planned networks 
increased from 34 to 149.  The government uses the network as an input into the production of their public 
services; Police, Emergency Management Services (EMS), and traffic services of a city are improved by mobile 
access to an internet network.  The network can also be used by citizens to access the internet for personal 
consumption.  A wireless network does not have fixed connection points, and so it allows one to have mobile 
access which is important for local public services and individual consumption.  A wireless network makes dual 
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usage possible when a wired network could not.  Across the nation cities are using different provision and 
ownership regimes for wireless network projects.  This paper will model how the demand by the government and 
consumers should determine the regime chosen. 
 The model examines an excludable public service in an incomplete contracting framework in which a non-
contractible investment can be made during the construction of the project which affects its value.  Relating to the 
example, after the initial contract is determined, innovative investments, such as unforeseen technology 
improvements can occur which increase the quality of the network in the provision of the service.  The regime 
chosen will affect the level of the non-contractible investment.  This level of investment affects the public and 
private value of the network.  Individuals using the network for personal consumption can be excluded so a profit 
maximizing firm has a value for this project.  This differs from previous research as a profit maximizing firm has no 
value for a pure public project.  This alters the firm’s incentives to make non-contractible investment.  The 
government seeks to choose the provision regime which maximizes the surplus generated from this project, 
specifically seeking to control the level of non-contractible investment.   
Literature Review 
The literature review focuses on privatization under the setting of incomplete contracts.  The objective of 
this literature is to determine the optimal ownership regime used to provide a public project.  Privatization is 
studied an incomplete contracting framework in which non-contractible investments are the main concern driving 
the provision and ownership regime chosen.  The method used in this paper follows closely to this strand of 
literature.   
Hart et.al. (1997) examines the determining factors of a government providing a service or contracting it 
out to a private firm, and focuses on an application to prisons.  Contracts are viewed as incomplete as the level of 
quality the government desires can not be completely specified.  Whether a private firm or the government 
provides a service, they can invest their time to improve its quality or to cut costs, and these investments are not 
contractible ex ante.  In general a private firm has a stronger incentive to invest in quality and cost reducing 
improvement than the government, but their incentive to reduce costs may damage quality.  Their general results 
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are intuitive; the case for government providing the service is stronger when non-contractible cost cutting 
measures have a larger damage on non-contractible quality and quality innovations are not important.  The case 
for private firms providing the service is stronger when quality damaging cost reductions can be controlled through 
contracts and quality innovations are important.  This paper was the first to examine the issue of privatization 
using the idea of incomplete contracts.  Ownership is the key issue in an incomplete contracting framework.  This 
idea was first used in determining the boundary between firms, and here was used to determine the boundary 
between private and public firms.  Hart et.al. (1997) allows the two types of investments, one that cuts cost and 
improves benefits and another which cuts cost and reduces benefits.  They need this second type of investment 
which reduces both costs and benefits to cause the government to own the project in some cases.  This paper only 
uses the “good” type of investment which improves benefits.  It will show the government generally wants to own 
the project when the government’s value for quality is larger than the private market value for quality.  
Besley and Ghatak (2001) study government versus private ownership of public goods.  They are 
concerned with ownership once again and their study focuses on pure public goods.  They assume the agents can 
not contract on the level of investment or realized quality, very similar to Hart et.al.(1997).  They assume that the 
agents bargain over the surplus from the project after the investment is sunk, and this investment depends on the 
surplus then received by each agent.  They contend ownership affects the disagreement payoffs to the agents and 
thus their share of the surplus and their incentives to invest.  They show that ownership should lie with the agent 
that values the benefits more irrespective of how the investment is made. They argue the investment incentive of 
both agents is higher when the agent with the greatest value of the benefits is the owner. 
  In Besley and Ghatak (2001) the non-governmental agency is not necessarily a profit maximizing firm, 
this organization just cares about the benefits and their example is school/education provision.  In this case a profit 
maximizing firm will not receive any benefits form this project because it is purely public, the firm can not exclude 
and extract any profit.  In this paper, by allowing for exclusion from the public good, this allows for the profit 
maximizing firm to gain some benefit from this project.     
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Hart (2003) reiterates the focus of this ownership question on contracting issues and examines public-
private partnerships (3Ps).  He comments that policy makers incorrectly argue 3Ps are good because they are a 
cheaper source of financing, when the focus should be contracting costs.  Under conventional government 
provision, a private firm builds the structure and a second firm operates, this operating firm could be a 
government or private firm.  Under a 3P regime, a single private firm builds and operates.  Their argument follows 
that from Hart et.al.(1997), and they use the same modeling structure to analyze 3P’s.  They ignore the choice of 
government or private ownership and assume that all provision is private.  The provision is broken into two stages 
building and operation as mentioned before.  In one case there are two firms; one that builds and one that 
operates; this is conventional provision.  In another case there is only one firm that provides both the building and 
operates, this is 3P.  In their model the non-contractible investments which take place in the building stage are not 
verifiable or observable by the government.  This means negotiations can not take place over their 
implementation.  Under conventional provision the building firm makes zero investment as they do not account for 
its affects on the provision stage.  This leads to an appropriate amount of the unproductive investment and not 
enough of the productive investment, as it relates to the first best.  Under 3P the building firm makes a positive 
level investment as they do account for its affect on the provision stage.  This causes a high level of unproductive 
investment and a low level of productive investment, as it relates to the first best.    Conventional provision is 
desired if the quality of the building can be well contracted and the quality of the service can not.  The 3P regime is 
desired if the quality of the service can be well specified and the quality of the building can not.  This paper is an 
introductory look at 3P’s, the analysis is a simplified model without considering many important variables, but it 
appears the author’s main point is made on the issue of incomplete contracting in public private partnerships.  The 
research presented in this paper uses the provision structure from Hart (2003). 
Bennett and Iossa (2006) takes off from this previous article on 3P’s and provides a detailed and in-depth 
analysis of this problem using the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) in the UK as their example for extending the basic 
model on privatization.  They use the same basic structure as previous papers mentioned in this literature.  Their 
addition is the examination of bundling the building and operation (management in their paper) of the service, 
they also examine how the ownership (residual control) when the contract expires affects the problem.  The idea 
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of non-contractible quality investments having a cost externality and an effect on the residual value is an 
interesting development by their paper and affect the optimal regime chosen.  These non-contractible investments 
are observable but not verifiable, and so the investment can not be renegotiated over.  But, these investments 
produce an innovation which when implemented is observable and verifiable and so the investor and the owner 
can renegotiate over the surplus generated by their implementation.  This is an important subtle difference from 
their paper with the previous literature.  The research presented in this paper uses the same idea as Bennett and 
Iossa (2006) concerning investment and what can be renegotiated.  We use the idea that investment creates an 
innovation that can be observed and verified and this allows renegotiation over the innovation’s implementation.  
The main tool used construct all of these models on privatization is the non-contractibility of investments 
that affect the benefits and costs of a project at different stages of provision (building and operation).  The optimal 
structure maximizes these investments so the greatest benefit is achieved.  The focus is on how the investment 
during building and operation stages are affected by who (firm or govt) is providing and the ownership after the 
contract period expires.  Different regimes produce different incentives to make these non-contractible 
investments which affect the benefits received from this project.  In all these cases the project is a pure public 
service.  For example, no citizen can be excluded from the protection provided by a prison, and it is non-rival, one 
person’s protection by a prison does not take away from the protection the prison provides to another person.  
This paper analyzes a public good that has a dual role and is excludable; this would appear to have an important 
role in determining the optimal provision regime. 
Incomplete Contracting 
In this section the paper discusses the definition of incomplete contracts and their application to 
privatization, which is the boundary between public and private firms.  I will discuss generally the idea of 
incomplete contracts and then its application to municipal wireless issues of ownership. 
How do incomplete contracts arise?  There is a limitation in contractual language that is the inability to 
describe accurately events before they happen, even when these events and their implications can be recognized 
after they occur.  The municipal wireless example fits this description of incomplete contracting.  There are limits 
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to what can be specifically contracted on between the firm (seller) who is building the wireless network and the 
government (buyer) who is using the network.  For simplicity assume that only one firm is contracting with the 
government.  So the government enters into an initial contract with the firm to build a wireless network.   
So, how is this initial contract incomplete?  First to cover are the issues which can be described by the 
contract.  The government is able to describe the boundaries of the network coverage.  The firm given these 
boundaries is able to assess how many devices and equipment are necessary to provide network coverage to this 
area with the technology given at this time of initial contracting.  The firm also needs to use many fixed assets 
(light poles, buildings, traffic signals) owned by the government to setup this network, this can also be described 
by the contract.  Also, contingencies can be written into the contract to allow for changes in network area.  The 
area of the network, which can be thought of as the structure being built is not difficult to contract on.   
However the language to describe the quality of the network and the contingencies arising in this realm 
can not be easily described in an initial contract.  The quality of the network is akin to the technology used to 
construct it.  Today wireless computer access is in its infancy, and one would expect the technology used for the 
network to evolve in unknown ways and quite rapidly.  One may expect wireless access to evolve in a similar 
fashion to hard line computer access.  Hard line access started over the phone line with very slow access and 
downloading files would take hours, and within a few years came the development of T1 lines with high speed 
internet access able to download files in seconds.  At this point wireless technology provides access but at speeds 
less than hard lines, the technology used to provide access appears to be in constant flux, similar to the 
development of hard lines and it may be sometime before a final technology to deliver this service is decided 
upon.  Hence the technology/quality of the network will be difficult to contract on, what is high quality one day 
may be low quality the next.  To write contingencies into the initial contract about its quality would be nearly 
impossible, as the development of this technology is unknown.        
The wireless network fits into a situation in which contracting is incomplete and ownership of the asset 
plays a role in how investments will be made as they can not be committed to in an initial contract.  This literature 
is known as the property rights theory of the firm.  This idea was first seen in Grossman and Hart (1986) in 
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determining the boundary between private firms and was extended to determine the boundary between public 
and private firms, commonly referred to as the issue of privatization in Hart et. al. (1997).  The relationship 
between the government and firm is one of a long term nature; if the initial contract was complete then ownership 
would not be an issue, the government could control the behavior of the firm with a detailed initial contract.  
There is no need for the government to own the project if the contract is complete.  As discussed above the quality 
of the project could possibly change and is it far too difficult to describe the contingencies which may arise.  A long 
term agreement on the specific quality can not be met at the initial contract.  After discussing at length the aspects 
of municipal wireless networks which are contractible and non-contractible and explaining why items fall into 
these categories, I will explain the portion of the model focused on non-contractible investment.  This should also 
act as a summary for what was discussed above. 
The private firm and the government meet to determine the initial contract.  In this initial contract they 
agree to the area of the network, this can be thought of as the physical structure of the project.  Contingencies 
arising in this realm to reduce or expand the network can be contracted on.  The quality of the service is difficult to 
contract on, all the possible contingencies arising in this realm are not possible to foresee, this is due in large part 
to the rapidly changing technology to provide this service that can affect the quality.  At the time of the initial 
contract, basic standards of quality can be described that are observable and verifiable.  In wireless network these 
basic standards would be a minimum connection speed and a minimum percentage of the network area able to 
make a connection.   
After this initial contracted level, the firm is able to make an investment researching innovations to 
improve upon these minimum quality levels.  This investment is observable but unverifiable, and only the private 
firm can make this investment.  One can think of this investment as the firm researching and learning how to 
improve the quality of the network beyond the minimum standards.  This investment is not in physical equipment 
but in human knowledge/capital, it is observable and unverifiable.  The result of this investment is an innovation 
which if implemented can improve the quality of the network.  The innovation implementation is assumed to be 
observable and verifiable, one may think of this actually being a change in the physical equipment of the network, 
it may likely be an improvement in the technology used to provide the service.  The owner of the asset has the 
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power to decide if this innovation will be implemented.  For our story now, the innovation will always be 
implemented because we have assumed that it increases the quality of the service.  Implementing this innovation 
is assumed to be costless in our model.  Since the new innovation is assumed to be observable and verifiable, the 
private firm and the owner of the asset can renegotiate over the surplus created by this innovation.  If the 
government is the owner, the firm will split the surplus under Nash bargaining rules.  If the firm is the owner, they 
do not need to bargain with the government and can implement this innovation on their own.  So, the ownership 
scheme chosen at the initial contract affects the bargaining situation the firm faces when implementing their 
innovation.  Once the initial contract determines ownership, the firm decides upon their level of non-contractible 
investment which depends upon the surplus they will receive from their investment which is determined by the 
bargaining situation.  This story of non-contractible investment and bargaining is very similar to that in Bennett and 
Iossa (2006).  Their paper assumes a pure public good/project.  Now introduce the idea of not just the government 
getting access to the network, but consumers using the network for personal consumption.  This added demand 
outside the government alters the problem the firm faces when choosing their level of non-contractible 
investment.  In previous literature the benefit from the investment was measured as a lump sum benefit to 
society.  In this paper the benefit will be much more explicit.  First, the benefit of the investment is an increase in 
the quality.  At the initial contract the government has a known fixed level of government usage.  That is police, 
EMS, traffic have a fixed usage of the network.  If investments are made to increase the quality of the network, the 
government will not change their usage demand for the network, although this will provide improved public 
service which increases the benefit to all the citizens of the municipality.  This part of the story falls closely to the 
story in the previous literature; however the private consumer market is different.  The demand for internet access 
by the private consumer will depend on the price/quality bundle available to them.  Holding price constant the 
demand for internet access will increase as the quality of the network increases.  The network usage by consumers 
is quite dependant on the quality, where as the government usage is fixed and does not depend on quality 
improvements.      
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Example 
Presented first is how the initial contracting game is played out; it does not include non-contractible 
investment.  This initial contract section serves as a benchmark to understand the timing and decisions of the 
game before non-contractible investment is built into the model.  Following initial contracting is a section on non-
contractible investment which improves quality, the model and result from that section is the main focus of the 
paper. 
Initial Contracting 
Covered in this section are the basic assumptions of the model; this is explained by the situation faced 
under initial contracting.  Initial contracting can be thought of as a situation with perfect information under 
complete contracting.  Both parties have knowledge on the items which are to be bargained over and they do not 
consider investment under incomplete contracting, as it is not possible in an initial contract.  In a situation with 
complete contracting ownership does not affect the payoffs, this will be shown by the example which follows.  One 
may then ask, why is initial contracting being discussed when ownership of the asset is the main point of interest?  
Understanding the assumptions and the intuition of the bargaining situation are quite difficult when investment 
(due to incomplete contracting) complicates the model.  The assumptions and the bargaining which occurs under 
the two ownership regimes will be laid out in a situation with complete contracting. 
There are two agents in the contractual relationship: Firm, Government.  The firm produces the asset, 
they are the seller.  The government will use this asset, they are the buyer.  The government demand for this asset 
is assumed to be fixed.  For the wireless example, given a constant size of government their demand for this 
network should not change.  The contractual relationship between the firm and government can take two different 
forms.  In one case, the firm controls asset and sells the use of the asset to the government; this is referred to as 
firm ownership.  In the other case, the firm sells control of the asset to the government; this is referred to as 
government ownership.  The government decides which ownership case to choose.  So far this problem and these 
assumptions would describe most contracting relationships between a firm and government over a public project 
(e.g. prisons).  In the problem for this paper, the asset can be used by a third party as well.  The asset is an 
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excludable public good, while the government uses the asset for public services; private consumers find use for the 
asset outside of the public service use.  For this outside use a private market is assumed.  The owner of this asset 
has access to sell its use to the private market.  For the private market, the seller faces a linear demand curve and 
acts as a monopolist.  Both the firm and government are aware of this outside market and so it plays a role in 
bargaining.  Next to discuss is the bargaining problem under each type of ownership. 
Firm Ownership 
The surplus functions for the two bargaining agents are as follows. 
Government Surplus: 
F
g
F pgVGS  )(  
FGS - Government surplus under firm ownership 
)(gV - Value of the asset to the government given a fixed level of demand, g  
F
gp - Price paid by the government for asset use under firm ownership 
Firm Surplus:     FFcFgF xcpFgcpFS   
 FgcpFg  - Surplus from government:c is marginal cost of providing asset use, F is fixed cost to produce 
asset 
  FFc xcp  - Surplus from private market: Fcp is consumer price under firm ownership, Fx is quantity sold to 
consumers under firm ownership 
The next piece of the bargaining problem is the action of the monopolist firm in the private market.  Linear inverse 
consumer demand function, 
FF
c bxap   
Private Market Profits:   FFFM
x
xcbxaMax
F
  
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Using FOC: 
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To simplify Firm Surplus now becomes,   FMFgF FgcpFS   
For the bargaining problem, we assume full information and both parties have an outside option of zero.  Using a 
Nash bargaining solution set government surplus equal to firm surplus and solve for the government price to use 
the asset, this price will determine the surplus for each party. 
Bargaining:
FF
g
F
M
F
g
F GSpgVFgcpFS  )(  
 
2
F
MF
g
FgcgV
p

  and 
  F
F
MF FS
FgcgV
GS 


2
 
The government’s bargaining position for their price to use the asset is improved by the firm having access to the 
private market.  The existence of this private market allows the government to pay a lower price for their usage as 
compared to a case in which the network is built only for government use.   
Government Ownership 
The surplus for the two agents will change now that the government provides asset use and has access to the 
private market. 
Government Surplus:     GGcGgG xcppgcgVGS  )(  
The government as the owner now incurs the marginal usage cost but can sell usage to the private market. 
Firm Surplus: FpFS Gg
G        
The firm transfers ownership of the asset to the government after incurring the fixed cost to produce it. 
In the private market, the government acts as a monopolist and sells usage in the same manner as the firm under 
firm ownership. 
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Private Market Profits:   GGGM
x
xcbqaMax
G
  
Using FOC: 




 

b
ca
xG
2
 and 
 
b
caG
M
4
2

  
To simplify Government Surplus now becomes,   GMGgG pgcgVGS  )(  
The profits from the private market do not depend on ownership, M
G
M
F
M   
The solution concept for the bargaining problem under government ownership is the same as that used under firm 
ownership.  One key difference is the price paid by the government to the firm; under government ownership it is 
the price to control the asset; under firm ownership it is the price to use the asset.   
Bargaining: 
GG
gM
G
g
G FSFppgcgVGS  )(  
 
2
MG
g
FgcgV
p

  and 
  GMG FS
FgcgV
GS 


2
 
The price paid by the government to the firm under government ownership is greater than under firm ownership 
as the monopoly profits accrue to the government (owner) of the asset.  However, the surplus received by the 
government will be exactly the same with government ownership as it will with firm ownership. 
 This example of the game without non-contractible investments illustrates the important decisions and 
behavior of the agents in the game.  It also shows that without a non-contractible investment the government has 
no incentive to choose one ownership structure over another as they receive the same payoff.  I have arbitrarily 
select values so that one can see the numerical payoffs from the two ownership structures above, these payoffs 
will be important for the following example which adds in the issue of non-contractible investment.  In this 
example and all subsequent examples: 
Set,   5,10,1,10,3,2/1,8  FggVgcba   
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This gives, 
   
5.12
2
38
,65
1
38
2




 Mcpx    
Under Firm ownership, 25.7,75.2  FFFg GSFSp  
Under Government ownership, 25.7,25.12  GGGg GSFSp  
As mentioned above the surplus for the government in both cases is the same even though they pay a different 
price to the firm. 
Non-Contractible Investment Increases Quality 
 The previous section discussed bargaining under an initial complete contract with perfect information, 
and it showed that ownership did not affect the payoffs of the two parties.  This section introduces the idea of an 
incomplete contract between the firm and government.  We assume that investment which will affect the quality 
of the network is non-contractible.  Since investment is non-contractible, ownership now plays a role in the level of 
investment chosen which affects the payoffs of the two parties. 
 We assume investment is non-contractible as contingencies to describe changes in the quality of the 
network will be difficult to describe in an initial contract.  I will use the example of a city-wide wireless network to 
illustrate how investment is non-contractible.  At this initial contract there is a given state of technology used to 
provide wireless access, the government and the firm can agree to its implementation.  However technology in this 
industry is rapidly changing.  Neither party can foresee the advance in technology and its affect on the quality of 
the network nor can they contract on these contingencies at the initial stage.   
After the initial contracting stage the firm can invest in developing a new technology.  This investment 
entails learning the new technology and how it will impact the quality of the network.  The investment made by 
the firm is observable but unverifiable and as such can not be contracted on.  We assume that if investment is 
undertaken and the innovation resulting from this investment is adopted, it will improve the quality of the 
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network.  This level of quality improvement due to the innovation is observable and verifiable and so its effect on 
the payoffs of the two parties can be bargained over at a time after the initial contract. 
Next is the description of the problem with non-contractible investment.  The following table shows the 
changes to the model with and without investment. 
Table 1: Summary of Complete Contraction vs. Incomplete Contracting 
 Without Investment With Investment 
Private Market bxapc   
2/1Qbxapc  ,
10   
Cost Structure   FgxcCost     IFgxcCost   
Government Benefits   ggV      12/1  QggV  ,
10    
 
New variables were introduced, Q, representing quality and I, representing investment.  The functions in the “With 
Investment” column will be used to construct an example and the structure chosen for these equations is next to 
be described.  In the private market, for a given quantity the price increases as quality increases but at a 
decreasing rate.  In the cost structure, investment is a fixed cost; the level chosen does not affect marginal cost.  In 
the government benefits, as quality increases the government benefit increases but at a decreasing rate.  A key 
assumption in the investment problem is that the expected quality increase is a result of the investment made and 
has a one to one relationship,   IQE  , and so to simplify the analysis, Q , is used instead of  QE .  This 
assumption is not too harsh since the decision of who should own is based entirely from expectations and 
backwards induction.  Investment and quality are interchangeable, throughout the equations that follow.  With a 
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description of how investment changes key elements in problem, the next step is to examine the problem under 
the two possible ownership regimes. 
Firm Ownership 
As mentioned before the focus is on the surplus created only by investment, this is equivalent to the surplus with 
investment minus the surplus from initial contracting.  First is firm surplus. 
 FFIFI FSFSFS   
      FgFFFFI pFIgxcxQbxaFS  2/1  
M
F
g
F FgcpFS   
  MFFFFI IcxxQbxaFS  2/1  
Next is government surplus. 
 FFIFI GSGSGS   
  FgFI pQgGS  12/1  
F
g
F pgGS    
2/1QgGS FI   
Under firm ownership, the firm makes the investment and controls the asset, and so they are not 
required to renegotiate with the government when implementing the investment.  The firm has access to the 
private market, they are able to gain surplus from the private market which creates an incentive to invest.  The 
firm also can not make a credible threat at renegotiation not to implement the innovation from investment due to 
the gain in surplus from the private market.  The government obtains a surplus from this investment without 
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having to pay the firm to make this investment.  The private market investment incentive for the firm has created a 
positive externality for the government.  The firm chooses the investment and private market quantity to maximize 
their surplus created by investment.     
  MFFFFI
Ix
IcxxQbxaFSMax  2/1
,
 , st. IQ   
FOC: 
x
FS FI


 returns 
b
Ica
x
2
2/1
  and 
I
FS FI


 returns 
2
2







x
I  
Mathematica is used along with parameter values to numerically solve for the private market quantity 
and investment which will then be used to find the government and firm surplus from investment.  The use of 
Mathematica allows us to focus and clearly see how the parameter values of concern affect the results.  The value 
of concern is the government surplus, and the parameters of concern are alpha and beta.  The Results section 
analyzes the results from Mathematica.  The next section examines government ownership.   
Government Ownership 
Next to examine is the case of government ownership.  The equations which represent the surpluses gained by 
each party will differ as the government is now the owner and has access to the private market.  First is firm 
surplus. 
 GGIGI FSFSFS   
FpIpFS Gg
I
g
GI   
FpFS Gg
G   
IpFS Ig
GI   
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I
gp - Price paid by the government for the firm’s implementation of the quality improvement as a result of the 
investment.  Only the firm can make the investment, and since the government is the owner, the firm will 
renegotiate with the government over the price paid to them for implementing this quality improvement.  A 
detailed discussion of the renegotiation is saved for later.  Next is government surplus. 
 GGIGI GSGSGS   
      IgGgGGGGI ppQggxcxQbxaGS  12/12/1   
M
G
g
G pgcgGS    
  IgMGGGGI pQgcxxQbxaGS  2/12/1   
In this case of government ownership the key variables to be chosen are still private market quantity, x, 
and the level of investment, I.  But now the government determines x instead of the firm.  The government 
chooses the private market quantity after the investment is made by the firm, so the government takes the 
innovation from investment as given.  The government chooses the private market quantity in the following way. 
  IgMGGGGI
x
pQgcxxQbxaGSMax  2/12/1   
FOC: 
x
GSGI


 returns 
b
Qca
x
2
2/1
 .   
The government uses the same rule as the firm to determine their private market quantity given the level 
of investment and the firm knows the government will use this rule.  The firm problem is to decide on the level of 
investment given this condition as to maximize their surplus.  A renegotiation between the firm and the 
government will take place over the innovation developed by the firm and the price paid for its implementation by 
the government.  This renegotiation takes place after the initial contract has been determined.  The firm learns an 
investment can be made but as they are not the owner of the network they will not receive any of the benefits 
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directly.  On the other hand, the government directly receives benefits from investment.  The investment increases 
surplus so the government will always want the firm to invest.  The firm and government will bargain over the 
surplus created.  A Nash bargaining solution is used under the assumption of perfect information on the effect the 
innovation has on government and private market surplus.  The firm and government gain no benefit if the 
innovation is not implemented and so their outside option is zero if renegotiation breaks down.  The surplus from 
the innovation will be split between the firm and government, so the price paid from the government to the firm 
for implementing the innovation and surplus reached through renegotiation are as follows. 
  MGGGIg QgcxxQbxap  2/12/1
2
1
  
  MGGGGI QgcxxQbxaGS  2/12/1
2
1
  
   IQgcxxQbxaFS MGGGGI  2/12/1
2
1
  
The firm knows this will be their change in surplus from bargaining and so they seek to maximize it given the 
government rule to choose the private market quantity. 
   IQgcxxQbxaFSMax MGGGGI
I
 2/12/1
2
1
   
st. IQ   and
b
Qca
x
2
2/1
  
FOC: 
I
FS GI


 returns 
 
I
b
cagb








2
28
2


 
Mathematica is used along with parameter values to numerically solve for the private market quantity 
and investment which will then be used to find the government and firm surplus from investment.  The use of 
Mathematica allows us to focus and clearly see how the parameter values of concern affect the results.  With a 
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solution for government surplus under both ownership regimes, the government chooses the ownership regime 
with the highest government surplus.  The Results section analyzes the results from Mathematica.    
Results 
The results present how government surplus and hence ownership changes with key parameter values.  
The parameters focused on are alpha and beta.  Alpha is a measure of how the private market values quality, 
2/1Qbxapc  , 10  .  If 0 , then low value of quality and if 1 , then high value of quality.  
Beta is a measure of how the government values quality,    12/1  QggV  , 10   .  If 0 , then 
low value of quality and if 1 , then high value of quality.    
The following table explains how ownership changes the investment decision and government surplus as 
it relates to the key parameters, alpha and beta.  This table provides intuition for the results seen in the graphs to 
follow. 
Table 2: Summary of Firm vs. Govt Ownership Impact on Investment and Govt Surplus 
 Firm Ownership Government Ownership 
Investment Choice Depends on alpha, firm receives 
entire surplus from private 
market 
Depends on alpha and beta, firm 
splits surplus from private market 
and government benefit with 
government 
Government Surplus from 
Investment 
Depends on alpha and beta, 
keeps entire government benefit 
surplus generated 
Depends on alpha and beta, splits 
surplus from private market and 
government benefit with firm 
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Figure 1: Alpha vs. Investment, Beta=0.50 for Government and Firm Ownership 
This graph shows how the level of investment differs between the two possible ownership regimes.  For 
this particular graph, investment is shown as a function of alpha and beta is held constant  50.0 .  The F 
labeled curve represents the level of investment under firm ownership, and the G labeled curve is under 
government ownership.  These two curves cross at approximately 73.0 .  So given a constant 50.0 , if 
73.0  then investment is higher under government ownership, and if 73.0  then investment is higher 
under firm ownership.  This result matches our expected general results which are driven by the renegotiation 
faced under each ownership regime and the value for quality increases by private consumers and the government.  
In general, for a given  , one would expect government ownership to result in a higher investment level for a low 
value of  .  Under government ownership the firm receives half the total surplus from the government and the 
private market, under firm ownership the firm receives the entire surplus from the private market.  For low values 
of   consumers do not value increases in quality and so the incentive for the firm to invest under firm ownership 
will be quite low.  On the other hand, under government ownership the firm receives half of the total surplus and 
so the incentive for the firm to invest will be larger for low values of   since they receive half of the government 
F
G
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surplus.  This argument follows similarly for high values of   but in the opposite direction.  Large values of   
give the firm a higher incentive to invest under firm ownership. 
 Next to show is how  affects the crossing point between ownership regimes which return the higher 
level of investment.         
 
Figure 2: Alpha vs. Investment, Beta=.7 for Government and Firm Ownership 
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Figure 3: Alpha vs. Investment, Beta=0.30 for Government and Firm Ownership 
 These graphs above show that the crossing point between ownership regimes returning the higher level 
of investment depends on beta.  The crossing point for 30.0  is 52.0 , for 50.0  is 73.0 , and 
for 70.0  is 87.0 .  As   increases the crossing point between the ownership regimes increases in  , 
this can result can be explained by how changes in   shift the curves in the graph.  As one can see from the 
previous graphs the curve for investment under firm ownership does not change as   varies, this is because under 
firm ownership the decision for the level of investment depends only on the private market and not on 
government surplus.  The curve for investment under government ownership does change as   varies; this is due 
to the fact that the level of investment depends on the private market and government surplus which is a function 
of  .  For smaller   the firm has less of an incentive to invest as the government surplus will not be large and so 
firm ownership produces a larger investment with a smaller value of .  So, as   increases the crossing point 
value of alpha needs to increase for firm ownership to dominate government ownership.  
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 Next to look at is the government surplus obtained under different ownership regimes.  The ownership 
regime with the higher government surplus will determine the regime chosen by the government at initial 
contracting.  The explanations used above for the results pertaining to the higher level of investment carry over 
the same logic to explain for the results concerning government surplus and the choice of ownership. 
 
Figure 4: Alpha vs. Govt Surplus, Beta=0.70 for Government and Firm Ownership 
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Figure 5: Alpha vs. Govt Surplus, Beta=0.50 for Government and Firm Ownership 
 
Figure 6: Alpha vs. Govt Surplus, Beta=0.30 for Government and Firm Ownership 
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 Government ownership dominating firm ownership for low values of  is explained by the same 
argument used above for investment.  Beta affects the crossing point for ownership changes in the same manner 
as well.  The crossing point for 30.0  is 42.0 , for 50.0  is 62.0 , and for 70.0  is 
75.0 .  As   increases the crossing point between the ownership regimes increases in , for the same 
reason as explained above.  The difference to highlight between investment and government surplus is that the 
crossing point for the same   is a lower  for government surplus than for investment.  For 50.0 , the 
crossing point for investment is 73.0  while that for government surplus is 62.0 .  This shows that as the 
government seeks the highest surplus possible, they switch from government ownership to firm ownership at
62.0  and lower the investment made by the firm but increase their surplus by changing the bargaining 
situation and so are able to increase the government surplus. 
Conclusion 
 The simulation and its result indicate that ownership choice does affect non-contractible investment 
made by the firm and the government surplus.  This also highlights how private consumer’s and government’s 
value for quality increases impact the ownership regime chosen by the government at the initial contract.  In 
general when the private market value for quality increases is greater than the government’s value for quality 
increases then the firm should own the project.  
 The paper currently studies the decision of ownership based only on non-contractible investment and the 
bargaining situation brought about by a private consumer market.  There may in fact be other important factors 
which affect the ownership choice for this type of good, such as the concern by the government over the exclusion 
of consumers in the private market and possibly how ownership affects the amount of funding needed by the 
government to obtain this type of project.  Future research could explore these issues.    
Why results happen? 
 In firm ownership, the firm receives the surplus from the private market 
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 In government ownership, the firm receives half of the surplus from government use and the private 
market 
 In firm ownership, the government receives the surplus from government use 
 In government ownership, the government receives half of the surplus from the government use and the 
private marker 
 The firm surplus and government surplus under government ownership is the same, except the firm 
incurs the cost of investment. 
 The differences in the value for quality increases between the private market (alpha) and government 
(beta) matter. 
As an example, suppose different values of alpha and beta and comment on why a certain ownership structure is 
chosen.  Suppose that the government has a high value for quality increases and the private market has a low 
value.  In this case we will get the result of the government choosing to own themselves.  This is because if the 
firmed owned then they would only gain surplus from the private market and since it has a low value for quality 
increases, then the firm incentive to invest is small and so they invest a small amount.  Since the government has a 
high value for quality they would like the firm to invest more, but due to its non-contractibility, the government 
can’t commit to paying for the investment.  So this small amount of investment leads to a small government 
surplus.  If the government chooses to own, then the firm receives half the surplus from the government and 
private market.  Since the government values quality increases highly, when the firm receives half of this surplus, it 
creates a greater incentive to invest.  And so, even though the government has to give up half of its surplus, the 
increased investment leads to a higher surplus for the government when they split it, as to when they free ride off 
the firm’s investment made when the firm owns and only considers the private market. 
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Untangling the Value of Open Space: Adjacent vs. Neighborhood Area 
 
Introduction 
Over the past 20 years, several studies have used hedonic theory to value open space land near a home.  
These studies have shown that open space such as parks, golf courses, conservation land and farm land provide 
value to nearby residents.  As land becomes scarce in urban and suburban areas, local governments, city planners, 
and housing developers are interested in the value that open space provides, as they strive to best serve their 
residents.  Open space value is inherently tied to distance for residents, so an understanding of how open space 
value changes with distance is of the utmost importance for land use decisions in planning housing communities 
and cities.   
This paper examines the value of open space capitalized into home prices, and is specifically concerned 
with the differing spatial measures of open space that residents value.  This issue is addressed by asking the 
questions: What is the premium for homes adjacent (within 30 feet) to open space?  What is the value of open 
space in a neighborhood area near a home? And finally does the adjacent and neighborhood value differ based on 
the type of open space?  The literature looks at many different types of open space, and each paper defines open 
space differently.  The broad common definition of open space is land that consists mostly of nature and is void of 
man-made structures.  For this study, open space is divided into categories based on two key characteristics: 
protection level and access.  And each of these has two categories: protected or unprotected, and public or 
restricted access.  The issue of protection involves whether or not the land that is open space today has the 
possibility of being developed into man-made structures in the future.  Access refers to whether or not the land is 
publicly accessible.  While there are many types of open space, all are defined by these two basic characteristics.  
This paper uses the three categories listed in Table 3 to group the open space data and perform analysis.   
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Table 3: Categorized Open Space Based on Protection and Access 
         Public Access Restricted Access 
                   Protected 
parks, cemeteries, national parks, 
lakes, river, golf courses 
private conservation land, private 
parks 
 
Unprotected ----------------- agricultural, vacant 
To answer these questions, the paper constructs a unique and large data set of home price transactions 
and open space measures for the Denver-Boulder metropolitan area.  The study utilizes several specifications 
including a nearest neighbor matching technique to examine the spatial value of open space by the categories in 
Table 3.  The study finds adjacency to any type of open space has a positive and significant impact on home sale 
price, and adjacency to protected land is valued three times more than unprotected land.  Unprotected land only 
adds value to adjacent homes and otherwise has no significant impact on home sale price.   An additional acre of 
protected land at ¼ mile is ten times more valuable than at 1 mile, indicating a rapid decline in value over distance 
greater than ¼ mile.  Irrespective of the specification or spatial measure, protected/yes access is valued highest, 
followed closely by protected/no access, with unprotected/no access coming in a distant third.  The results of this 
paper give planners a better understanding of how residents value open space over distance, and this allows for 
proper land use policies in the future. 
There is quite a great deal of literature estimating open space’s effect on residential property values.  
Several papers focus on measuring how the value changes with distance to different open space types. The 
categories into which previous literature fits based on distance measures, and types of open space is presented in 
Table 4. 
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Table 4: Categorized Open Space Literature Focused on Distance Measures 
 Value % 
open 
space in 
buffer 
(1/4 -1/2 
mile) 
from 
home 
Value 
distance 
to open 
space 
from 
home 
Value 
home 
adjacency 
to open 
space 
Study 
protected 
lands 
with 
public 
access 
Study 
protected 
lands with 
restricted 
access 
Study 
unprotected 
lands with 
restricted 
access 
Control for 
neighborhood 
unobservables 
Bolitzer and 
Netusil (2000), 
Lutz and Netusil 
(2001) 
 X  X    
Anderson and 
West (2006) 
 X  X   X 
Irwin (2002), 
Geoghegan et. al. 
(2003) 
X   X X X  
Chesire and 
Sheppard (1995) 
X   X X   
Do and 
Grudnitski 
(1995) 
  X X    
Metz (2010) X X X X X X X 
 Some papers focus on protected open space, but are unconcerned with the value of unprotected lands 
(Bolitzer and Netusil 2000; Lutzenhiser and Netusil 2001; Anderson and West 2006).  These studies look at how the 
value changes with distance, along with different demographic variables, but none considers the adjacent value of 
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open space.  Other literature looks at the differences in value between protected and unprotected land (Irwin 
2002; Geoghegan et. al. 2003).  These studies look at the value of open space in an area surrounding a home, and 
look at how a percentage increase in open space within a ¼ to ½ mile radius affects a home’s value.  Their research 
also does not include the value of adjacent open space.  Another study (Chesire and Sheppard 1995) focuses on 
determining the difference in value between protected lands that allow access and protected lands that do not 
allow access; again, they only measure this value as a percentage of land in a ½ mile radius.  A study that explicitly 
considers an adjacency premium (Do and Grudnitski 1995) focuses on how homes located next to a golf course are 
valued much higher than homes just across the street.   
Previous research has returned unexpected results for different types of open space.  In many cases it 
finds a much higher value for permanently undeveloped open space that restricts access (private conservation 
land) compared with land that has public access (Irwin 2002).  Researchers argue that a negative externality from 
congestion occurs at public access space, leading to a lower value compared with restricted access land.  The 
magnitude of the difference in these values cannot be explained solely by congestion; in one study (Irwin 2002), 
conservation land is valued nearly four times more highly than public protected land.   
Although previous research has studied the three categories of open space mentioned above, each paper 
appears to exclude some category and so would bias the results.  Although all papers use the hedonic pricing 
method to estimate the value for open space through home prices, the various studies’ research designs vary 
dramatically.  Some previous literature uses a ½ mile (or shorter) buffer around a home and determines the 
comparative value for types of open space against a baseline land use.  The observations for a ½ mile buffer cannot 
inform one if the open space is adjacent to a home or ½ mile away, and also if the adjacent value is quite large and 
dissipates over that ½ mile dramatically.  Other literature looks only at the distance from open space in a linear 
fashion, and it could miss the importance of the adjacent value, which is expected to be quite large.   
One econometric issue in estimating the value of open space is correlated omitted variables.  Previous 
research has attempted to control for this issue by using fixed effects at fine geographic scales (Anderson and West 
2006), looking at variation within a census block group.  Census block groups are quite small in urban areas, and 
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are often one block in size.  It is difficult to see how there is much variation of open space properties in such a 
small area.1   
This paper contributes in several ways to the wider literature on valuing open space.  First, it untangles 
the value of being adjacent to open space and the value of open space at a neighborhood level.  Most previous 
work only examines the value of open space at the neighborhood level (not adjacent).  The only exception is (Do 
and Grudnitski 1995), which examines adjacency to golf courses on a small scale.  This current paper examines all 
types of open space and on a much larger scale.  This paper contends that the adjacent value is quite important.  
For example, a house with a property line bordering a public park (distance of 0ft to open space), as opposed to a 
house across the street from the park (distance of 60ft to open space), could have very different values for open 
space as a result of this small change in distance, where congestion and view have changed.  Second, this paper 
simplifies the categories of open space into the two most salient properties: access and level of protection.  
Previous papers separate open space into each individual category (e.g. public park, natural park, conservation 
land, or agricultural), and this paper’s simplification of the categories is an attempt to get at the basic properties 
that drive the value differences in open space lands.  Each open space land is inherently unique, so without being 
able to value each land separately, this paper’s category breakdown reflects the base decision a planner or housing 
developer makes, based on what type of open space is near homes.  Third, the size of our sample is larger than any 
other open space study to my knowledge, based on housing sample size and number of open space lands.  Also, 
the study area is the Denver-Boulder metro area, whose governments take great care in preserving and allocating 
land for open space.  This abundance of open space lands allows for a wide amount of variation and provides us 
with many observations through which to investigate the adjacency premium.  Fourth, this paper uses a larger 
level for fixed effects than previous literature, census tracts which consist of multiple block groups.  While still 
small enough to believe that omitted variables are being controlled for, this allows for a wider variation in open 
space measures.  And finally, this paper uses a nearest neighbor matching technique, not used previously in the 
literature.  This technique is an improved control for neighborhood effects and unobservable quality of home 
                                                             
1
 Their study used straight line distance to the nearest types of open space; this could provide some variation if a 
block group is 1,000 ft in length and the mean distance to open space is quite short, such as 2,000 ft.   
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build.  Nearest neighbor matching is used to obtain an accurate estimate for the adjacency premium and how this 
premium changes with distance to matching homes. 
Conceptual Framework 
This section provides a brief theoretical model incorporating all three categories of open space along with 
their breakdown between adjacent and neighborhood level value.  The section ends with a detailed construction 
of the econometric model. 
The model uses standard hedonic theory (Rosen 1974); a home is viewed as having a bundle of attributes 
that consist of several different characteristics, and the combination of these characteristics determines the sale 
price of the home.  The hedonic price schedule is based on households maximizing their utility facing a budget 
constraint.  Household   maximizes utility subject to the budget constraint: 
(1)               s.t .            
Where   is income,   is a numeraire good with price normalized to 1, and   is a vector of housing characteristics.  
The relationship between a home’s sale price and its characteristics is represented by the hedonic price function: 
(2)                
Where   is a vector of structural housing characteristics,  is a vector of neighborhood characteristics, and   is a 
vector of open space characteristics.     vector decomposed contains open space adjacency characteristics,     
and open space neighborhood area characteristics,     .  The variable,    , is a dummy equal to 1 if a home’s lot 
is within 30ft of open space.  The variable,     , is continuous and equal to the percentage of open space within a 
radius (1/4 or 1 mile) of the home.  The open space price function is represented by a linear function: 
(3)          
 
                
 
    
Where     represents a home’s open space properties in relation to protected lands with access      ;     
represents a home’s open space properties in relation to protected lands with no access       ; and     
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represents a home’s open space properties in relation to unprotected lands with no access         .  At the 
optimum, the partial derivative of the hedonic price function with respect to a specific attribute represents the 
marginal implicit price of that attribute; this is the marginal willingness to pay for an attribute.                          
(4) 
      
     
                   
      
      
             
 From this model, there are several testable implications based on the properties of the open space land 
and the channels               through which value is added to the home’s price.  First, expectations for the 
adjacency premium are as follows:               ,               ,               and             .  
Homes adjacent to open space plausibly gain their value from having a view of undeveloped land without any 
other property between the home and open space, and for this reason adjacency to any type of open space is 
expected to positively impact a home’s value.  Homes adjacent to protected lands should have a higher premium 
than that for unprotected lands, as the latter has a possibility of being developed in the future and the adjacent 
property will lose the view of undeveloped land.  The effect of access to protected lands on the adjacency 
premium is ambiguous.  On the one hand, lands with access may have a higher value than those with no access 
simply because the homeowner can use the land for recreation, and on the other hand, this access may include 
noise and congestion that reduces the value of homes adjacent to accessible lands.  
 Next, expectations for the neighborhood area value are as follows:                     and 
          .  Homes with open space in their neighborhood plausibly gain value by having access to nearby land 
and to protected land that reduces future population density.  Protected lands with access are expected to have 
the highest value in a neighborhood, because they provide proximity to recreation and create lower density 
neighborhoods, which homeowners value.  Protected land without access is expected to have a slightly lower 
value, because it cannot provide recreation amenities to its nearby residents.  Unprotected lands without access 
are expected to have the lowest value and possibly no value at all, because the land will plausibly be developed in 
the future, increasing density and having no recreation value. 
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 Theory does not provide guidance for selecting an appropriate functional form for the hedonic price 
function.  Several forms are seen in the literature: linear, semi-log, log-log, and Box-Cox.  The form for each paper 
appears to be chosen by the authors to best fit their data and study objectives.  This paper uses a semi-log form in 
order to examine the effect of housing characteristics on the percentage change in house price.   A hedonic 
function with the following form is estimated: 
(5)                                                               
Where    is the sale price of home i, in census tract c.    is a vector of continuous home structural characteristics.  
    is a vector of dummy and discrete home structural characteristics.   and   are parameter vectors for home 
characteristics to be estimated.  A is the set of adjacent open space variables,      is a vector of adjacent open 
space characteristics of category a, and    is a parameter vector of adjacent open space characteristics of category 
a.   is the set of neighborhood open space variables,       is a vector of neighborhood open space characteristics 
of category b, and    is a parameter vector of neighborhood open space characteristics of category b.     is a 
census tract fixed effect,    is a quarter of year sale fixed effect, and    is a year of sale fixed effect. 
 The variables of interest are those for open space characteristics.  For the first model, open space in a 
neighborhood surrounding a home is measured with an adjacency dummy variable for each category of open 
space adjacent to a home, along with interaction terms for homes adjacent to multiple categories of open space, 
and with percentage of open space land for each category within a fixed radius (1/4 mile or 1 mile) of the home.  
For the second model, distance dummies to the nearest piece of open space land are estimated and divided into 
separate regressions by open space category nearest the home.          
Data 
 The study area, Figure 7, consist of most of the Denver-Aurora-Boulder combined statistical area.  The 
area of study includes seven counties: Adams, Arapahoe, Broomfield, Boulder, Denver, Douglas and Weld.  The 
housing price data consists of 115,627 single family home sales from Metrolist, Inc. for 2002-2008 and includes 
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several home characteristics.  The summary statistics are provided in Table 5.  
 
Table 5
Summary Statistics for Housing Characteristics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Sale Price (2002 dollars) 263,602 123,639 11,909 1,000,000
Lot Size (acres) 0.216 0.287 0.014 9.656
# of Baths 2.39 0.853 0.5 9
Home Size (sqft) 1,771 750.7 273 11,794
Age of House (years) 22.63 26.81 0 137
Garage Attached to Home 0.801 0.399 0 1
Garage not Attached to Home 0.00884 0.0936 0 1
A/C in Home 0.858 0.349 0 1
Fireplace 0.491 0.5 0 1
Basement 0.804 0.397 0 1
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Figure 7: Location of 115,627 homes in the study area.  Bolded names are counties. 
37 
 
The open space data come from several sources.  The majority of the data are from Colorado Ownership, 
Management and Protection (COMAP) v7 database from Colorado State University, this data set contains 
protected open space lands and their level of access.  The remaining open space data come from the GIS 
departments of the counties in the study area, and these data contain protected lands with their level of access 
not included in the COMAP data set and unprotected open space lands that do not have access.  Combining these 
open space data sets, we obtain a comprehensive set of 7,497 protected and 108,901 unprotected open space 
lands along with their level of access.  For the purposes of the study, open space is assigned to one of three 
categories: protected/access, protected/no access, and unprotected/no access.  These three categories are 
selected to divide open space into the most salient features of open space that affect their value, level of 
protection and level of access.  Protected/access includes golf courses, rivers, lakes, public parks, and recreation 
facilities.  Protected/no access includes conservation easements, city and county protected land, and private 
parks.2  Unprotected/no access includes agricultural and vacant land; there is no category for unprotected/access, 
because no open space land fits into this category.  The summary statistics for open space are provided in Table 6.  
Open space by category in the study area is shown in Figure 8. 
 
 
                                                             
2 The COMAP database indicates 1,363 lands that are protected but have an unknown level of access.  These lands 
are put into the category of protected/no access.  Lands with unknown access are most likely conservation land or 
government protected land where the level of access is not reported.  Local governments are very likely to report 
the access level for protected lands that have access, such as parks and recreation facilities.  For this reason, the 
assumption is made that protected lands of unknown access most likely do not have access. 
Table 6
Summary Statistics for Open Space Characteristics
Open Space Category
Number of 
Open 
Spaces
Mean 
OS 
Acreage
Standard Deviation 
(acres)
Min 
(acres)
Max 
(acres)
Protected/Access 4,093 263 4223 0 238335
Protected/No Access 3,404 69 352 0 10099
Unprotected/No Access 108,901 26 86 0 4153
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Figure 8: Open space by category in study area 
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From the home and open space data, GIS software is used to construct a spatial data set of a home’s 
relationship to open space land.  Three types of open space relationships are constructed: adjacent to a category 
of open space, percentage of open space category within a 1 mile radius, and the distance to the nearest category 
of open space.3   
A home is considered adjacent to open space if the perimeter of the home lot is within 30ft of an open 
space land.   A 30 ft buffer is chosen as the breakpoint to account for small errors in the GIS spatial data, because 
this study is bringing together GIS data from several sources that can be a few feet from matching exactly.  The 
data also have slight discrepancies in the line work defining the perimeters of land parcels; an urban road is 
suggested to be minimally 32 ft in width, and so a buffer of 30 ft is selected to avoid considering an open space 
land across the street from a home as adjacent.4  Summary statistics for homes adjacent to open space are 
provided in Table 7. 
   
The percent of open space within a 1 mile radius captures the area for types of open space in a distance 
near a home.  This variable treats open space area adjacent to the home the same as open space area 1 mile away.  
                                                             
3 Percentage of open space within a 1 mile radius is calculated as follows.  A circle with a radius of 1 mile is 
constructed with the home at the center of the circle.  The area of open space within this circle is calculated and is 
divided by the total area of the circle to obtain the percentage of open space. 
4
 30 ft is selected to differentiate between houses directly next to open space and those across the street.  From 
inspection, a mass of homes is located 45 ft and 62 ft from open space, and these distances are the same as the 
widths of most typical roads.  A buffer of 30 ft ensures that our adjacent variable is only considering homes directly 
next to open space and not across the street.   
Table 7
Summary Statistics for Homes Adjacent to Open Space
Adjacent to Open Space Categories
Number of 
Homes
% of 
Adjacent 
Homes
% of 
Total 
Homes
Protected/Access 4,014 21.1 3.5
Protected/No Access 2,827 14.9 2.4
Unprotected/No Access 11,512 60.6 9.9
Protected/Access and Protected/No Access 110 0.6 0.1
Protected/Access and Unprotected/No Access 250 1.3 0.2
Protected/No Access and Unprotected/No Access 280 1.5 0.2
Total 18,993 100.0 16.4
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For this reason buffers of different radii (1/4 mile, 1 mile) can be created to see how open space area changes 
value at different distances from the home.  Summary statistics for percentage of open space within a 1 mile 
radius from the home are provided in Table 8. 
  
The distance variable for homes to open space only measures the distance to the open space category 
that is closest to a home.  This variable does not measure the distance to the nearest category of open space for all 
categories, but only a single distance to the open space that is nearest to a home.  5  The variable is constructed in 
this way to capture the change in value over distance isolated for each category of open space.  Summary statistics 
for distance from home to nearest category of open space are provided in Table 9. 
 
The main model uses fixed effects at the census tract level.  Figure 9 shows a map of the median census 
tract with locations of homes and open space that is approximately 1 sq mile and contains 179 homes.  This figure 
of a median census tract illustrates variation in the open space variables within a census tract.  Figure 10 shows a 
                                                             
5
 Previous research includes the distance to all types of open space in one single regression.  If the majority of a 
home’s value for open space is from the nearest land as opposed to lands further away, then breaking up 
regressions based on the open space category closest to a home may give a better understanding of how distance 
to each category of open space affects the value of a home. 
Table 8
Summary Statistics for % Open Space 1 Mile Radius from Home
% Open Space Category Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
% Protected/Access 7.0% 7.8% 0.0% 99.1%
% Protected/No Access 5.2% 8.4% 0.0% 83.2%
% Unprotected/No Access 16.1% 18.6% 0.0% 99.7%
Table 9
Summary Statistics for Distance from Home to Nearest Category of Open Space
Distance to Nearest Open Space 
Category
Number 
of Homes 
Nearest
Mean 
(1000ft)
Standard Deviation 
(1000ft)
Min 
(1000ft)
Max 
(1000ft)
Distance to Protected/Access 32,355 0.45 0.39 0.00 2.39
Distance to Protected/No Access 10,867 0.32 0.35 0.00 2.40
Distance to Unprotected/No Access 72,405 0.39 0.38 0.00 2.98
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map of homes inside the median census tract from Figure 9, illustrating the difference in prices of similar homes 
based on adjacency to open space. 
 
Figure 9: Median census tract, approximately 1 sq mile, containing 179 homes.  Circles show 
the 1 mile radius buffer for a home at the NW and SE corner of the census.   
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Figure 10: Zoom in of Median census tract, showing difference in prices for similar homes 
based on adjacency to open space.   
43 
 
Results 
 Several models are estimated to explore the relationship between open space and home price.  The first 
model is estimated using a semi-log model with a fixed effects approach at the census tract level.  The equation for 
estimation includes housing characteristic variables, dummies for adjacency to categories of open space, and 
interaction terms for homes that are adjacent to multiple categories of open space, and the percentage of land 
within a 1 mile radius for each open space category.  The results are provided in Table 10. 
OLS with Census Tract FE for Adjacency and Neighborhood Area Value 
 
Table 10
Estimated Coeffients - Model 1 (1 Mile Buffer Radius)
VARIABLES log_saleprice standard error
Ln of Lot Size (acres) 0.122*** 0.00248
# of Baths 0.0450*** 0.00127
Ln of Home Size (sqft) 0.448*** 0.00256
Age of House (years) -0.00121*** 7.00E-05
Garage Attached to Home 0.0143*** 0.00247
Garage not Attached to Home 0.0305** 0.00931
A/C in Home -0.0128*** 0.00328
Fireplace 0.0223*** 0.00121
Basement 0.106*** 0.00158
Adjacent Protected/Access 0.0493*** 0.00306
Adjacent Protected/No Access 0.0406*** 0.00412
Adjacent Unprotected/No Access 0.00773** 0.0026
% Protected/Access 0.199*** 0.0117
% Protected/No Access 0.0924*** 0.0104
% Unprotected/No Access 0.0166 0.0102
Adjacent Protected/Access * Adjacent Protected/No Access -0.0584** 0.0185
Adjacent Protected/Access * Adjacent Unprotected/No Access 0.0186 0.016
Adjacent Protected/No Access * Adjacent Unprotected/No Access 0.0145 0.0187
Ln of Block Mean Lot Size (acres) 0.0549*** 0.00408
Observations 115627
R-squared 0.818
Year and Quarter Dummies YES
Census Tract FE YES
***P=0.001; **P=0.01; *P=0.05
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 The coefficients for the housing characteristics are as expected and very similar to results from previous 
literature.  The only coefficient that is somewhat surprising is the negative sign for air conditioning (A/C).  This 
could be explained by the climate of the Denver area coupled with the fact that older homes are more likely to not 
have A/C and those older homes of a high quality have not been replaced with new housing that would most likely 
have A/C.  Therefore, not having A/C may represent a higher quality build for the home and thus have a negative 
coefficient.  Also included as an explanatory variable is the mean size of neighborhood lots, this term is significant 
and positive as expected.
6
 
A home being adjacent to an unprotected/no access open space land is estimated to increase a home’s 
sale price by 0.77%.  The sale price increases for homes adjacent to protected/no access and protected/access land 
are 4.06% and 4.93%, respectively.7  These estimates match expectations; there is a much larger value for being 
adjacent to protected land compared with unprotected land, and this is most likely because of the fact that 
unprotected land can be developed in the future, which diminishes its value.  Also, the difference in value between 
protected with and without access is quite small, which suggests that the level of access does not matter when 
valuing open space next a home, and having permanently undeveloped land is creating the majority of the value.  
Using the mean sale price for a home in the data set to interpret the coefficients, a home adjacent to 
unprotected/no access increases in value by $2,030, a home adjacent to protected/no access increases in value by 
$10,702, and a home adjacent to protected/access increases in value by $12,995.    
F-tests are conducted to determine whether the estimated coefficients for open space category adjacency 
are statistically different from each other.  The null hypothesis of equal values for adjacent unprotected/no access 
and adjacent protected/no access can be rejected (P=0.000).  Also, the null hypothesis of equal values for adjacent 
unprotected/no access and adjacent protected/access can be rejected (P=0.000).  However, the null hypothesis of 
equal values for adjacent protected/no access and adjacent protected/access cannot be rejected (P=0.0891). 
                                                             
6 Inclusion of this variable in the regression reduces the coefficients on the percentage open space variables; this 
suggests that large neighborhood lot sizes substitute for open space in a home’s neighborhood. 
7
 As a check, homes less than 62 ft were considered as adjacent.  Including these additional homes from 30 to 62 ft 
reduces the adjacency premium from the regression results more than 20% as compared to the 30 ft buffer.  This 
indicates an important difference in being directly next to open space and across the street. 
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The results for the interaction terms indicate that being adjacent to both protected with and without 
access is close in value to being adjacent to one category of protected open space; this result is to be expected.  
The two other interaction terms are positive but are not significant. The interaction terms between the different 
categories of open space all have quite large standard errors, most likely because of the small number of homes 
adjacent to multiple categories of open space, as seen in Table 7. 
The coefficients for the categories of percentage open space within a 1 mile radius match our 
expectations.  At a radius of 1 mile, one expects lands with access to be valued most highly, as people can enjoy 
the recreational benefits of an open space land with access.  We can interpret a 10% increase in protected/access 
land results in a 1.99% increase in a home’s sale price.  Next in value is protected/no access, a 10% increase in its 
land results in a 0.92% increase and a 10% increase in unprotected/no access results in a 0.17% increase in value.8  
These coefficients are significant except for unprotected/no access.  This is expected because unprotected land 1 
mile from a home should not have much impact on its value.  A discussion of the monetary value related to these 
coefficients is saved for the next sections comparison with a buffer radius of ¼ mile. 
F-tests are conducted to determine whether the estimated coefficients for percentage open space 
category within a 1 mile radius are statistically different from each other.  The null hypothesis of equal values can 
be rejected (P=0.0000) for all three tests between the categories.  
                                                             
8
 Removal of adjacency dummies from the regression raises the coefficients for the percentage of open space 
variables which translates into approximately a 0.1% increase in the interpretations.  Although, this is a small 
amount, the absence of adjacency dummies does bias the results upward as expected. 
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Next, we take a look at the same model but now use a buffer radius of ¼ mile, and the results are 
provided in Table 11.  Here we are concerned with comparisons against the 1 mile buffer radius. 
 
Examining the coefficients for adjacent to open space, we obtain similar results for a ¼ mile radius as we 
do with a 1 mile radius; this is to be expected.  F-tests have the same results as well.  The concern here is how the 
percentage of land category coefficient varies between the ¼ and 1 mile radius. 
F-tests are conducted to determine whether the estimated coefficients for the percentage of open space 
within a ¼ mile radius category are statistically different from each other.  The null hypothesis of equal values can 
be rejected (P=0.0000) for tests between unprotected/no access and both protected categories open space.  
Although, the null hypothesis of equal values for protected/no access and protected/access cannot be rejected 
(P=0. 2009), at this very close distance an increase in percentage of protected lands has a very similar impact. 
Table 11
Estimated Coeffients - Model 1 (1/4 mile Buffer Radius)
VARIABLES log_saleprice standard error
Ln of Lot Size (acres) 0.123*** 0.00247
# of Baths 0.0448*** 0.00127
Ln of Home Size (sqft) 0.448*** 0.00256
Age of House (years) -0.00128*** 7.00E-05
Garage Attached to Home 0.0127*** 0.00247
Garage not Attached to Home 0.0282** 0.0093
A/C in Home -0.0132*** 0.00328
Fireplace 0.0221*** 0.00122
Basement 0.106*** 0.00159
Adjacent Protected/Access 0.0425*** 0.00301
Adjacent Protected/No Access 0.0360*** 0.00415
Adjacent Unprotected/No Access 0.0134*** 0.00257
% Protected/Access 0.0765*** 0.00878
% Protected/No Access 0.0414*** 0.00854
% Unprotected/No Access -0.0767*** 0.00845
Adjacent Protected/Access * Adjacent Protected/No Access -0.0478** 0.0182
Adjacent Protected/Access * Adjacent Unprotected/No Access 0.0167 0.0159
Adjacent Protected/No Access * Adjacent Unprotected/No Access 0.0118 0.0188
Ln of Block Mean Lot Size (acres) 0.0600*** 0.00408
Observations 115627
R-squared 0.818
Year and Quarter Dummies YES
Census Tract FE YES
***P=0.001; **P=0.01; *P=0.05
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 The coefficients for the categories of percentage open space within a ¼ mile radius still have the same 
rank, but their values change quite substantially.  It is important to note that a circle with a radius of 1 mile has an 
area of 2,010 acres, whereas that of a ¼ mile radius is 126 acres.  Given this difference, it is difficult to make 
comparisons between the regression results of these different radii.  We must equate these percentage regression 
results into equal area changes.  Table 12 presents the interpretation of the percentage open space regression 
results for the two radii. 
 
A straight forward interpretation of the regression results looks at how a 10% increase in open space land 
affects a home’s value.  This is not a good choice of interpretation for comparison purposes between the different 
radii, because the acreage increase for a 1 mile buffer as opposed to ¼ mile is quite large, as seen in Table 10.  For 
policy purposes, decisions for open space are not made by changes in percentages of land but rather by actual land 
size.  The last columns of Table 12 look at the effect of a 1 acre increase in open space land.  As expected for 
protected lands, the addition of 1 acre at ¼ mile is more valuable than at 1 mile.  Slightly surprising is that at ¼ 
mile, an acre is almost 10 times more valuable than at 1 mile.  This result shows how the value of additional 
protected open space land declines quite rapidly with distance.  Also interesting, at ¼ mile the value difference for 
level of access is very small.  This has important policy impacts, if a housing development is being created near 
farmland; a conservation easement will provide as much value as turning the farmland into a park.  This is 
important, because a conservation easement will most likely be cheaper than a park.  Table 10 also shows that the 
addition of unprotected land at 1 mile has almost no impact, whereas at ¼ mile it has a sizable negative impact.  
This negative value is most likely because vacant land very near a home has a greater chance of being developed in 
the future compared with vacant land at a distance further away. 
Table 12
Interpreation of Regression Coefficients from Tables 10 and 11
Open Space Type Reg. Coeff. Mean % Open Space Acreage $ Value % Value $ Value
1 Mile Buffer
% Protected/Access 0.199*** 7.01% 14.09 $5,246 0.14% $370
% Protected/No Access 0.0924*** 5.17% 10.39 $2,436 0.09% $237
% Unprotected/No Access 0.0166 16.11% 32.38 $448 0.01% $26
1/4 Mile Buffer
% Protected/Access 0.0765*** 5.15% 0.65 $2,017 1.18% $3,110
% Protected/No Access 0.0414*** 2.85% 0.36 $1,091 1.15% $3,031
% Unprotected/No Access -0.0767*** 8.47% 1.07 -$2,022 -0.72% -$1,898
10% Increase in Open Space Land 1 Acre Increase in Open Space Land
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OLS with Census Tract FE for Adjacency and Distance to Nearest Open Space Value 
  A second group of models is estimated to determine how distance to the nearest category of open space 
impacts the value of a home.  In the first model we examined adjacency, and while approximately 15% of the 
sample is adjacent to some category of open space, the rest of the sample is a measure away from the nearest 
piece of open space; we are interested in how this value changes over distance.  Previous studies have a distance 
variable to the nearest open space for all categories.  Relating to our variables, this would mean that each home 
would have a distance to the nearest protected/access land, a distance to the nearest protected/no access land 
and a distance to the nearest unprotected/no access land.  These three variables would go into one regression, 
and although this is telling us how home value changes with distance to open space, it is giving us a general feel of 
how open space land is valued in a neighborhood around a home, much like the percentage of open space land in 
a radius from the previous section. 
This section takes a different approach; here the focus is the piece of open space.  A home most likely gets 
the bulk of its value from the single closest piece of open space land.  For example, if home A is 100 ft from the 
nearest protected/no access land, 1,000 ft from the nearest protected/access land, and 500 ft from the nearest 
unprotected/no access land, most plausibly the protected/no access land 100 ft away will contribute the majority 
of added home value.  Also, if home B is 1,000 ft from the nearest protected/no access land, 1,000 ft from the 
nearest protected/access land, and 1,000 ft from the nearest unprotected/no access land, home A and home B are 
the same distance from the nearest protected/access, but holding everything else constant except these distances 
to other open space categories, one would expect a different value between the homes for distance to nearest 
protected/access even though the distance is exactly the same.  For this reason, the piece of open space land 
becomes the focus, and if we were able to run an experiment, we would place each category of open space at the 
center of a bulls eye and place homes at distances around the open space.  This would give an understanding of 
how value changes for each category of open space as the distance to a home increases.
9
   
                                                             
9
 This method is an attempt to examine how the value of a home varies with respect to its distance from the 
nearest open space type.  Although this method makes a restrictive assumption that homes do not gain value from 
the next closest piece of open space land.  If one believes the closest piece of open space will have the largest 
49 
 
The large data set for this study allows us to examine the issue of distance in the approach stated above; 
we have a much larger number of open space lands and home transactions than any other previous open space 
study.  When we restrict the distance measures as stated above, we still have 10,867 homes that have 
protected/no access as their nearest category of open space, 32,355 homes nearest to protected/access and 
72,405 homes nearest unprotected/no access.   The results are provided in Table 13.  The housing characteristics 
estimates are omitted from the table, because they are very close to the estimates seen in Tables 10 and 11.  
Dummy variables for distance were used in the model; this was done as the study’s main focus of is adjacency, and 
estimation of the adjacency premium is not possible with a continuous distance variable.  Also, the value over 
distance is not expected to behave linearly, so dummies give some flexibility.  The adjacency coefficients from 
Tables 10 and 11 are interpreted as the difference in value between homes adjacent and those not adjacent.  Here 
the adjacency coefficients are interpreted as the difference in value between homes adjacent and homes greater 
than 700 ft away from open space.  In the Data section, Table 9 shows most homes are within 1,500 ft of an open 
space type, so for practical purposes the coefficients for the dummy distance variables can be considered a 
comparison with homes 700-1,500 ft from their open space type.  Also included as an explanatory variable is the 
census block mean lot size, and we expect results similar to those found in Table 10 and 11.  The size of the nearest 
open space land is included, holding other factors constant.  As the size of the nearest open space land increases 
one would expect the value of homes to increase.  The results of the three open space categories are presented in 
Table 13.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
effect on a home’s value compared to land further away, then perhaps separating the regressions into types is 
preferred to having one single regression with all types.  
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The adjacency coefficients for all open space category regressions are significant, and they have the same 
rank and a similar magnitude as previous results from Tables 10 and 11.  Mean size of block group lot is significant 
and performs similarly to Tables 10 and 11 for all regressions. 
   Estimates for unprotected/no access show significant results for all dummies.  The value is greatest for 
homes adjacent to unprotected/no access, it is positive and trends smaller as the distance from the land increases.  
F-tests are conducted to determine whether the estimated coefficients for the distance dummies are statistically 
different from each other.  The null hypotheses of equal values between adjacency and the other distance 
dummies can be rejected, but the null hypothesis of the equal values between the other distance dummies cannot 
be rejected.  A negative coefficient for the size of the nearest unprotected/no access land supports the negative 
coefficient results from Table 9 for percentage unprotected/no access land in a ¼ mile buffer.  Each regression in 
Table 13 is comparing homes that are roughly within ¼ mile of open space.  The results for each open space 
category are of the same rank as percentage land variables within a ¼ mile, as shown in Table 11, and have a 
similar magnitude. 
Table 13
Estimated Coeffients - Model 2
VARIABLES log_saleprice standard error log_saleprice standard error log_saleprice standard error
Adjacent Protected/Access 0.0511*** 0.00331
(30ft-100ft) Protected/Access 0.00204 0.0037
(100ft-300ft) Protected/Access 0.00334 0.00235
(300ft-700ft) Protected/Access 0.0032 0.00206
Ln of Block Mean Lot Size (acres) 0.0608*** 0.00958
Ln of Nearest Protected/Access Size (acres) 0.00703*** 0.000811
Adjacent Protected/No Access 0.0287*** 0.00542
(30ft-100ft) Protected/No Access -0.00414 0.00603
(100ft-300ft) Protected/No Access -0.0107* 0.00454
(300ft-700ft) Protected/No Access -0.0077 0.00428
Ln of Block Mean Lot Size (acres) 0.0360** 0.0138
Ln of Nearest Protected/No Access Size (acres) 0.00413*** 0.00106
Adjacent Unprotected/No Access 0.0181*** 0.00299
(30ft-100ft) Unprotected/No Access 0.00857** 0.0031
(100ft-300ft) Unprotected/No Access 0.00595** 0.00208
(300ft-700ft) Unprotected/No Access 0.00764*** 0.00182
Ln of Block Mean Lot Size (acres) 0.0587*** 0.00491
Ln of Nearest Unprotected/No Access Size (acres) -0.00276*** 0.000405
Observations 32355 10867 72405
R-squared 0.878 0.872 0.798
Year and Quarter Dummies YES YES YES
Census Tract FE YES YES YES
***P=0.001; **P=0.01; *P=0.05
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Distance dummy estimates for protected/access lands are all very small positive values that are 
insignificant, except for adjacency.  As seen in Table 11, there is a positive value for being near protected/access 
land, but Table 13 indicates it doesn’t matter whether the home is 30 or 1,500 ft from the land, the value is very 
similar.  Table 13 also shows adjacency has a premium and its value is similar to the results from Table 10 and 11. 
Distance dummy estimates for protected/no access lands are small negative values that are mostly 
insignificant, except for adjacency.  Once again adjacency performs quite similarly to results from Tables 10 and 11.  
Perplexingly, houses from 30 to700 ft are valued lower than homes 700 to 1,500 ft from protected/no access.  Still, 
given this strange result, adjacency is a clear way in which a home gains value, and being located 30 ft or 1,500 ft 
from protected/no access does not have a large effect on the home’s value. 
In general, the results of Table 13 show that adjacency is an important and distinct way in which home 
value is increased by open space.  Also, changing the distance between 30 ft and 1,500 ft to the nearest open 
space category does not have much effect on changing the home’s value.  
Nearest Neighbor Matching 
 This section focuses on estimating the premium associated with homes adjacent to open space.  Also, 
does this premium difference between treated (adjacent) and non-treated (non-adjacent) vary with distance and 
type of open space?  Nearest neighbor matching technique can answer these questions and provides advantages 
over the standard OLS hedonic regression.  Matching estimators make no assumptions about the linearity between 
the home price and the house’s characteristics.  In this paper’s context, a non-parametric strategy makes sense, 
given the previous literature on valuing distance to open space in which the selection of functional form (linear, 
semi-log, Box-Cox) is quite arbitrary.  Intuitively, the relationship between price and distance to open space is not 
linear.  Comparing a home adjacent to open space with a home 100 ft away, one expects a large price difference, 
whereas comparing a home 100 ft from open space with a home 200 ft away, one expects a much smaller price 
difference.  The OLS strategy described previously uses a census tract fixed effect in an attempt to control for 
neighborhood effects.  The median census tract is 1 sq mile.  At this level there is still enough variation in the 
covariates to identify the parameters, but plausibly neighborhood effects are typically concentrated at a smaller 
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level.  Using a finer geographic level for fixed effects results in little variation of the covariates, which is a problem 
for linear regression.  Matching allows for comparison of homes on a finer scale, because we can compare a home 
adjacent to open space with a home across the street that has matching home structural characteristics. 
 Treated and untreated homes are matched on bathrooms, home size (sq ft), and lot size (acres).  These 
home characteristics are continuous, so exact matches between homes are not possible.  A bandwidth for 
acceptable matches is set at: +/- 0.5 baths, +/- 300 sq ft, and +/- .04 acres.  Matching requires common support for 
treated and untreated homes.  They must have similar values for observable structural housing characteristics, and 
a representative example is shown in Figure 5.  If a treated home does not have matches that fall within this range, 
it is eliminated from the sample, and this technique is used to ensure “good” matches.  For the base model, 
treated homes are only matched with a single untreated home within 1,500ft (approx. ¼ mile) and within the 
acceptable bandwidth.  For example, the entire sample has 2,827 homes adjacent to protected/no access land.  
Once narrowed by the bandwidth; the sample is reduced to 1,684 treated homes.  The main identifying 
assumption is that given “good” matches the only factor affecting house price differences between treated and 
untreated homes is adjacency to open space.  Following (Abadie and Imbens 2006), the matching estimation uses a 
regression-based bias adjustment, to eliminate bias introduced by poor match quality given continuous covariates.  
Table 14 displays the results for the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) for protected/no access.   
 
Figure 11 shows how a 1,500 ft buffer around a treated home is a much smaller area for comparison than 
a 1 sq mile census tract.  The objective is to control for neighborhood effects and achieve a more accurate estimate 
Table 14
Matching Homes Adjacent to Protected No Access on Baths, Sqft, and Lot Size
VARIABLES log_saleprice standard error
ATT, Using Control Homes within 1500ft of Treated 0.0256 0.0048
Treated Observations 1684
# of Matches 1
Treated Obs. Excluded with Matches Outside Bandwidth (Bath 
Diff > .5, Sqft Diff > 300sqft, and Lot Size Diff >.04 Acres)
53 
 
for the adjacency premium.  Comparing the results from Table 14 for matching 2.56% and OLS for a ¼ mile buffer 
3.60%, one can see that the matching estimator is lower than the OLS estimate. This makes sense given the 
geographic level on which comparisons are being made.  At this finer level (1,500ft) homes are most likely in the 
same housing sub-division and have a similar quality.  At the census tract level, a majority of the houses used for 
comparison will not be in the same subdivision and most likely will have differing levels of quality.  Most plausibly 
the neighborhood with open space will have higher quality homes, whereas a neighborhood ½ mile away which 
does not have open space will have lower quality homes.  OLS with census tract fixed effects have estimates that 
include all these lower quality homes for comparisons, thus resulting in a larger adjacency premium.  Matching 
estimates only use comparison homes of a similar quality; thus, better control of neighborhood quality results in a 
smaller adjacency premium.  
Also of interest is how this adjacency premium changes with distance.  If the allowable distance from a 
treated observation to its control match is varied, this should give insight on how the value of open space changes 
with distance.  A buffer distance of 300 ft is used to divide the control matches, and so only treated homes with an 
acceptable match inside of 300 ft are used.  These treated homes will first be compared with control matches 
within 300 ft, and then these same treated homes will be compared with control matches between 300 ft and 
1,500 ft.  This matching procedure only allows the estimation of the treatment effect on the treated, but the 
difference in the parameter estimates should give an idea of how the value of open space changes over distance.  
Table 15 displays the results.  
 
Table 15
Matching Homes Adjacent to Protected No Access on Baths, Sqft, and Lot Size
VARIABLES log_saleprice standard error
ATT, Using Control Homes within 300ft of Treated 0.017 0.0054
ATT, Using Control Homes 300ft-1500ft of Treated 0.0226 0.0096
Treated Observations 499
# of Matches 1
Treated Obs. Excluded with Matches Outside Bandwidth (Bath 
Diff > .5, Sqft Diff > 300sqft, and Lot Size Diff >.04 Acres)
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The standard errors are quite large.  The small number of observations is the most likely cause, and the 
treated observations were reduced so dramatically because they had to have a match inside of 300 ft and another 
match from 300 to 1,500 ft.  The table shows that treated homes matched with control homes inside a 300 ft 
buffer have a smaller premium for adjacency 1.70% than those same treated homes matched with controls 
between 300 and 1,500 ft, 2.26%.  An increase in the ATT suggests a larger home price difference for control 
homes further away.  This result suggests that as distance to protected/no access increases, home price decreases, 
all else held constant. 
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Figure 11: Median Census Tract, Matching Protected/No Access. A representative home is 
selected showing all possible matches within the acceptable bandwidth. 
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 This same matching strategy is used for the other two types of open space, protected/yes access and 
unprotected/no access, and the results are presented in Tables 16 and 17 respectively. 
 
Examining protected/yes access results shows that as the control matches move from less than 300 ft to 
the 300 to 1,500 ft range, the premium for adjacency changes very little, from 3.53 to 3.29%.  This indicates that 
the change in value over distance for protected/yes access is very small for houses not adjacent.  The premium for 
adjacency also drops slightly, which makes the argument that homes not adjacent to protected/yes access but very 
close (less than 300 ft) have lower values than homes further away (300-1,500 ft) due to congestion and traffic 
from the publicly accessible open space.  As noted previously, the number of treated observations for 
protected/yes access drops substantially from 2,625 to 729 when the sample is limited to treated observations, 
which must have an acceptable match under 300 ft and between 300 and 1,500 ft.  The same is true for 
unprotected/no access as the treated observations drop from 6,799 to 1,582.  The premium for being adjacent to 
protected/yes access using controls in a 300 ft radius is 3.53%, which as expected is greater than both 
protected/no access 1.70% and unprotected/no access 0.36%. 
Table 16
Matching Homes Adjacent to Protected Yes Access on Baths, Sqft, and Lot Size
VARIABLES log_saleprice standard error log_saleprice standard error
ATT, Using Control Homes within 1500ft of Treated 0.0417 0.0033
ATT, Using Control Homes within 300ft of Treated 0.0353 0.0047
ATT, Using Control Homes 300ft-1500ft of Treated 0.0329 0.0054
Treated Observations 2625 729
# of Matches 1 1
Treated Obs. Excluded with Matches Outside Bandwidth (Bath 
Diff > .5, Sqft Diff > 300sqft, and Lot Size Diff >.04 Acres)
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Examining unprotected/no access results shows that as the control matches move from less than 300 ft to 
the 300 to 1,500 ft range, the premium for adjacency changes a small amount, from 0.36 to -0.56%, and is not 
significantly different from zero.  This result indicates that being adjacent to undeveloped land provides no real 
benefit for home owners.  Also, the premium drops as control homes are located further away, indicating that 
home owner’s benefit from being further away from unprotected/no access.  Homeowners most likely believe this 
land will be developed in the future and wish to be further away, given the uncertainty of the type of development 
and the possible future negative externality associated with it. 
Conclusion 
This paper uses hedonic analysis of home transactions in the Denver-Boulder metro area to estimate the 
effect of open space on sales price.  This paper considers three categories of open space, unprotected/no access, 
protected/access and protected/no access, and each type of open space fits into one of these three categories.  
The effects of open space are also allowed to vary by adjacency and neighborhood area.  For OLS, census tract 
fixed effects are used to control for neighborhood characteristics along with unobserved quality of home build.  As 
a robustness check, a nearest neighbor matching estimator is used to better control for neighborhood effects and 
to allow for flexibility from the linear assumptions of OLS. 
The results yield several important insights.  First, there is an important difference between the adjacent 
and neighborhood value for open space.  The distinction between homes directly adjacent and across the street 
from protected open space is important; adjacency to protected open space provides a substantial premium.  A 
Table 17
Matching Homes Adjacent to Unprotected No Access on Baths, Sqft, and Lot Size
VARIABLES log_saleprice standard error log_saleprice standard error
ATT, Using Control Homes within 1500ft of Treated 0.0071 0.0036
ATT, Using Control Homes within 300ft of Treated 0.0036 0.0049
ATT, Using Control Homes 300ft-1500ft of Treated -0.0056 0.0071
Treated Observations 6799 1582
# of Matches 1 1
Treated Obs. Excluded with Matches Outside Bandwidth (Bath 
Diff > .5, Sqft Diff > 300sqft, and Lot Size Diff >.04 Acres)
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home’s value for adjacent protected land is more than three times the value for an additional acre of protected 
land ¼ mile from the home.  Results indicate that if the distance to the nearest open space varies between 30 and 
1,500 ft, there is no effect on home price.  At distances beyond ¼ mile the value for protected open space drops off 
dramatically.  An additional acre of protected open space at ¼ mile is almost 10 times more valuable than at 1 
mile. 
Second, the category of open space is important to differences in home values.  Protected/access land is 
valued slightly higher than protected/no access for both adjacency and neighborhood value; this indicates that 
access is a valuable property of open space.  These results go against previous literature, which indicates 
protected/access lands may have a lower value at close proximity because of a noise/congestion effect.  
Unprotected/no access adjacency provides a small positive value almost three times less than protected lands.  
Also of note, an additional acre of unprotected/no access land at ¼ mile reduces the value of a home.  Generally 
speaking, unprotected/no access land does not provide value to nearby homes. 
Finally, controlling for unobservable neighborhood characteristics is important in obtaining accurate 
estimates for open space value.  Nearest neighbor matching allows for a finer control of unobserved quality of 
home build compared with OLS fixed effects.  Matching obtains smaller adjacent values for all categories of open 
space while still maintaining positive significant coefficients.  This result indicates that unobserved spatial 
differences occur at a very fine geographic scale, possibly less than ½ mile.  
These results have important policy implications.  Unprotected lands provide a small adjacency premium 
but in a neighborhood area may reduce home values.  Protected lands provide a sizeable adjacency premium and 
in a neighborhood area increase home prices.  This result suggests that government protection of open space lands 
is valuable and important.  However, protected/access lands have a larger value than protected/no access lands 
for adjacency, and for an additional acre at ¼ mile, the difference is not substantial.  This result suggests that if 
farmland is going to be converted into protected open space, access may not be important to providing additional 
value.  A government may choose to create private conservation land over a public park, as it most likely costs less.  
At a radius of 1 mile, an additional acre of protected/yes access land provides 1.5 times more value than 
59 
 
protected/no access.  Combining this result with similar values for an additional acre at ¼ mile suggests that if 
there is high population density within 1 mile of proposed protected land, then a public park may be favored.  If 
there is low population density within 1 mile, private conservation land may be preferred.  The Denver-Boulder 
metro area has an ample amount of protected open space land for this study.  This relatively high amount of 
protected open space as compared to other areas in the United States may lead to some concern in the absolute 
value of the results being applicable to an area with a lower amount of protected open space.  On the other hand, 
one may expect the relative results found in the Denver-Boulder area to persist in other communities.  Urban areas 
most likely value protected/yes access highest, followed closely by protected/no access, with unprotected/no 
access coming in a distant third.         
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Effect of Distance to Public Schooling on Home Prices 
Introduction 
Over the past 10 years, several studies have examined the impact of public school quality on home prices.  
A home’s location is tied to local public schooling, and so more desirable schooling areas should be reflected in 
relatively higher home prices.  Value for public schooling is inherently a spatial issue; most previous papers 
attempt to control for neighborhood location differences in home prices and isolate the difference in school 
quality value.  The conclusions drawn imply that homes within a school boundary have the same value for school 
quality.  Well, homes are located at varying distances from public schooling and so one must be curious as to 
whether home prices vary with this attribute.  If home prices do vary with distance to schooling then estimators 
for school quality which use matching across school boundaries need to account for their distance from the school.   
This paper uses hedonic analysis of home transactions in the Denver Public School District to estimate the 
effect of distance to schooling on sales price.  This study considers all three levels of public location based 
schooling: elementary, middle and high school. While most studies on schooling and home prices investigate the 
change in home value based on quality of schooling, this paper attempts to control for school quality differences 
and focus on the value for distance to schooling.  School boundary fixed effects are used to control for differences 
in school quality and neighborhood characteristics tied to residential location.   
Previous literature, Black (1999), Bogart and Cromwell (2000), uses school boundaries to examine how 
differences in school quality are reflected in housing prices.  These studies find a premium for living in areas with 
better schooling, a brief summary of the different methods is found in Gibbons and Machin (2008).  A recent paper 
by Fack and Grenet (2010) adds to the school quality literature by showing how the availability of private schooling 
reduces the premium paid by homeowners to live in school areas with higher quality. 
This paper while controlling for school quality differences across our sample, must also control for outside 
school options and desirable land near schooling locations to isolate the premium associated with distance to 
public schooling.  To accomplish this, data is collected on the number of charter and private schools within a 1 mile 
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radius of a home to measure availability of outside options.  Also, data is collected on commercial land within 1/8 
mile of schools, as residents may value shopping and business areas near a school. 
Econometric Model 
The model uses standard hedonic theory (Rosen 1974); a home is viewed as having a bundle of attributes 
that consist of several different characteristics, and the combination of these characteristics determines the sale 
price of the home.  The hedonic price schedule is based on households maximizing their utility facing a budget 
constraint.  Household   maximizes utility subject to the budget constraint: 
(6)               s.t .            
Where   is income,   is a numeraire good with price normalized to 1, and   is a vector of housing characteristics.  
The relationship between a home’s sale price and its characteristics is represented by the hedonic price function: 
(7)                 
Where   is a vector of structural housing characteristics,  is a vector of neighborhood characteristics, and     is 
a vector of schooling characteristics.      vector contains distance to elementary, middle and high school data.  
 Theory does not provide guidance for selecting an appropriate functional form for the hedonic price 
function.  Several forms are seen in the literature: linear, semi-log, log-log, and Box-Cox.  The form for each paper 
appears to be chosen by the authors to best fit their data and study objectives.  This paper uses a semi-log form in 
order to examine the effect of housing characteristics on the percentage change in house price.   A hedonic 
function with the following form is estimated: 
(8)                                              
Where    is the sale price of home i, in school boundary c.    is a vector of continuous home structural 
characteristics.      is a vector of dummy and discrete home structural characteristics.   and   are parameter 
vectors for home characteristics to be estimated.  A is the set of distance to schooling variables,      is a vector of 
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distance to schooling of category a, and    is a parameter vector of distance to schooling of category a.     is a 
school boundary fixed effect, and    is a year and quarter of sale fixed effect. 
 The variables of interest are those for distance to schooling.  The school boundary fixed effects are used 
to control for differences in school quality in an attempt to isolate the change in home value from the distance to 
public schooling.    
Data and Summary Statistics 
 To estimate the impact of distance to schooling on housing sales in Denver, data was collected on 
schooling location and boundaries, housing characteristics, and land use near schools for years 2002-2004. The 
area of study is the Denver Public School District, Figure 12, which coincides with the county and city of Denver. 
The housing data consists of 22,264 single family home sales from Metrolist, Inc. for 2002-2004 and includes 
several home characteristics.  The housing summary statistics are provided in Table 18. 
 
Table 18
Summary Statistics for Housing Characteristics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Sale Price (2002 dollars) 247,720 126,172 29,828 999,681
Lot Size (acres) 0.15 0.055 0.023 0.916
# of Baths 1.9 0.824 0.5 9
Home Size (sqft) 1,406 647 273 6,514
Age of House (years) 51.93 32.98 0.1 129
Garage Attached to Home 0.456 0.498 0 1
A/C in Home 0.913 0.282 0 1
Fireplace 0.512 0.5 0 1
Basement 0.678 0.467 0 1
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Figure 12: Location of 22,264 Home Sales for 2002-2004 in the Denver School District, 
Catchment Areas are for the 2002-2003 School Year. 
Figure 12 contains the boundaries for 2002-2003 school year catchment areas.  Each catchment area has 
an elementary, middle and high school tied to homes inside of its boundaries.  While this paper is aimed at how 
distance to schooling is valued for all schooling levels, it makes sense to use fixed effects for each unique 
catchment area.  There are approximately 10 elementary and middle schools which have the same school location 
and the same school boundaries.  This leads to collinearity issues if fixed effects are used at each level of schooling, 
and this would lead to biased results.  So, each catchment area is used as a geographic level for fixed effects, this 
approach has two outcomes.  First, it solves the collinearity issue by not having the geographic fixed effects 
overlap and match.  Second, the goal of the paper is to control for quality of schooling by geographic areas and 
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estimate the effect of distance to schooling.  This method controls for all levels of schooling tied to a home’s 
location and makes comparison within that group across distance. 
Data on school catchment areas was provided by the Planning Department of the Denver Public School 
(DPS) District.  Since the data on home sales span multiple years, there is a concern catchment areas have changed 
over this time. While catchment areas are adjusted each year, it is often a very small change to incorporate a new 
school into the district. Upon examination of 2002 and 2004 catchment areas are almost identical, and so the 
concern for catchment areas changing is lessened.  Since home sale data are from 2002-2004, most buyers are 
making school location based decisions using the reputation of the schools from the past and so for that reason, 
2002 catchment areas are used to define the boundaries of the schools for all home sales. 
While catchment areas seen in Figure 12 are used to control for school and neighborhood quality 
differences, Figures 13a, 14a, and 15a show the school boundaries for elementary, middle and high school 
respectively. Figures 13b, 14b, 15b are histograms for distance to assigned schools from homes.
Figure 13a: 85 Elementary Schools in DPS and their Boundaries. 
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Figure 14a: 21 Middle Schools in DPS and their Boundaries. 
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Figure 15a: 10 High Schools in DPS and their Boundaries. 
67 
 
 
 The above maps and histograms indicate how distance to each level of schooling varies dramatically 
based on the number schools in each level and the size of the boundaries.  Using the same continuous distance 
measure for all three levels assumes value for distance behaves in a linear manner when plausibly this relationship 
may not be.  For this reason, distance dummies of differing bin width are used to investigate how value to 
schooling changes with distance. 
 The Denver Public School District also collects testing data on student ability.  The testing places students 
into four categories: unsatisfactory, partially proficient, proficient, and advanced.  Successful outcomes for 
students are those which are proficient or advanced.  While DPS tests on many subjects, the most common for 
schools in the sample are reading, writing, and math.  For this study, the data on testing will be used as a proxy for 
school quality.  Schools with a higher percentage of students proficient indicate a higher quality and thus a more 
desirable school, distance to schooling effects are expected to be greater in schooling areas of higher quality and 
so this measure will be used to control for differences in school quality.10 Testing data was obtained from DPS for 
                                                             
10
 Thought was given to using the percentage of student net transfers for a school area as a proxy for school 
quality.  While this measure plausibly captures differences in school quality, it may also be capturing the ability or 
lack thereof for residents to transfers their children between schools.  
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the 2002-03 school year.  Table 19 summarizes the percentage proficient for the average of reading, writing, and 
math for school levels in the DPS. 
 
 Outside schooling options, charter and private schools, could have an impact on the value for residence 
based schooling.  As the number of outside schooling options near a home increases, this should weaken the value 
for distance to schooling. The DPS area of study contains 27 charter and 31 private schools. Table 20 summarizes 
the number of charter and private school within a 1 mile radius of each home in the sample.  
 
 There is concern that the distance to schooling variables in the regressions are not giving a true value for 
proximity to school but instead picking up the value of other desirable lands located near schools.  Specifically, the 
concern is that open space and businesses are near school locations and so the analysis may be picking up the 
value of these lands when distance to schooling is actually of lesser value. Data was collected on the percentage of 
open space and commercial land within 1/8 mile (660ft) of each school and also for the percentage within each 
school’s boundary. The difference between these two percentages indicates whether or not these lands are 
clustered near schools. A negative number indicates that the percentage of land within in 1/8 mile of a school is 
less than the percentage of land in the entire school boundary, thus not clustered near schools.  Table 19 
summarizes the difference between these percentages for each land use and each school level.  The open space 
categories follow from the methodology in (Metz 2010). The summary in Table 21 indicates these lands are not 
very clustered near schools except for commercial and protected open space with access for high schools. While 
School Level Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Elementary 35.6% 18.3% 3.2% 81.7%
Middle 23.1% 12.4% 5.3% 63.1%
High 28.1% 15.7% 9.6% 69.9%
Table 19
Summary Statistics for Percentage Proficient at Average of Reading, Writing and Math
School Level Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Charter 0.727 1.022 0 7
Private 1.078 1.331 0 6
Table 20
Summary Statistics for Number of Schools within 1 mile of Home
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this data for high schools is troublesome, a series of regressions attempts to control for land use near schools in 
attempt to obtain an accurate value for distance to schooling. 
 
 As shown, (Metz 2010) distance to the nearest open space is of value to homeowners. There is concern 
about the correlation of distance to closest open space and distance to schooling. If these are highly correlated, 
the distance to school measure may be picking up the value for distance to nearest open space. Table 22 shows 
the correlation between the distance to level of schooling and the distance to type of open space.  The shaded 
boxes are the results of interest. 
 
School Level Variable Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Commercial -4.0% 5.9% -44.8% 16.7%
Protected Open Space with Access -1.3% 10.1% -34.8% 31.2%
Protected Open Space without Access -1.0% 10.4% -51.1% 20.9%
Unprotected Open Space without Access -5.8% 10.9% -40.5% 3.4%
Commercial -4.4% 6.2% -14.6% 19.3%
Protected Open Space with Access -1.6% 8.0% -19.1% 19.7%
Protected Open Space without Access -5.4% 10.4% -36.2% 2.7%
Unprotected Open Space without Access -7.4% 11.6% -32.0% 11.5%
Commercial 1.5% 10.0% -11.1% 21.8%
Protected Open Space with Access 6.8% 11.0% -5.2% 23.1%
Protected Open Space without Access -5.6% 6.9% -19.9% -0.6%
Unprotected Open Space without Access -11.1% 14.0% -39.5% -0.8%
Elementary
Middle
High
Table 21
Summary Statistics for the Difference in Percentage Land Use
within the Entire School Boundary and 1/8 mile from School
Unp/No Acc P/No Acc P/Yes Acc Elementary Middle High
Unprotected/No Access 1
Protected/Yes Access 0.1009 1
Protected/No Access -0.1856 -0.3646 1
Elementary -0.0736 -0.2071 0.0786 1
Middle 0.1018 0.0814 -0.1283 0.1183 1
High -0.2164 -0.3154 0.6579 0.2486 -0.0097 1
Correlation between distance to closest open space type and distance to schooling level
Table 22
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Table 22 indicates that distance to open space and schooling are not highly correlated.  The one exception 
being distance to protected land with access and high schools.11  This result is expected given the clustering of this 
land near high schools as indicated in Table 21. 
Results 
 Several models are estimated to explore the relationship between distance to assigned public schooling 
and home price.  The first group of models is estimated using a semi-log model with a continuous measure for 
distance to schooling.  The second group of models is similar in methodology to the first group but instead uses 
dummies for distance to schooling to investigate the non-linear nature for distance to schooling value.  All models 
use cluster robust standard errors at the census tract level, there are 162 census tracts in the sample.  
Model 1: Continuous Measure for Distance to Schooling  
 Table 23 shows the results of esimating the hedonic housing price equation using a continuous distance 
measure as an explanatory variable.  Columns 1 thru 3 all use year and quarter fixed effects as controls. Also, 
columns 1 thru 3 all have housing characteristics as a control variable, the estimates from columns 1 and 2 for 
these variables are similar in magnitude and statistical signifigance to (Metz 2010) study on open space, this paper 
uses a subset of the housing sample from (Metz 2010).  The only thing to note is that column 3 which drops school 
boundary fixed effects and uses other controls, results in some peculiar estimates for a few housing characteristics 
which raises suspicion that this specification may have problems. 
 The aim of this study is to control for neighborhood and school quality effects in an attempt to isolate the 
value for distance to public schooling.  So, Column 1 and 2 use school boundary fixed effects to control for 
neighborhood and school quality. These geographic fixed effects are shown in figure 12, each boundary is defined 
by a unique combination of elemntary, middle and high school.
12
  Homes within the same boundary attend the 
                                                             
11 For this reason, data on percent of protected/access land near a high school is collected and used in the 
regression analysis.  If this variable is not included, value for distance to high schools may actually be picking up the 
value for protected/access open space.  
12
As mentioned earlier, using fixed effects for each school on each schooling level creates collinearity problems, as 
many elementary and middle schools share the same location. 
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same schools on all three levels.  This level of fixed effect appears to be the best way to control for school qualiy 
that is tied to a residential location.13  
 
                                                             
13 For example, two homes are located near each other and both have the same elementary and middle school but 
a different high school, if the high schools are of differing qualities then the house price difference could be 
attributable to this single difference. So, if these homes are grouped for comparison only based on the same 
elmentary school, results on distance to schooling may be biased by this high school quality difference. 
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VARIABLES log_saleprice log_saleprice log_saleprice
Ln of Lot Size (acres) 0.105*** 0.0941*** 0.0382*
(0.010) (0.0093) (0.0221)
# of Baths 0.0710*** 0.0716*** 0.0884***
(0.0044) (0.0041) (0.00570)
Ln of Home Size (sqft) 0.420*** 0.409*** 0.422***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.0169)
Age of House (years) -0.000833*** -0.000658*** 0.00181***
(0.000221) (0.000203) (0.000409)
Garage Attached to Home 0.0164*** 0.0130** -0.0427***
(0.0056) (0.0053) (0.00995)
A/C in Home -0.0261*** -0.0173** -0.0332***
(0.0077) (0.0076) (0.00985)
Fireplace 0.0475*** 0.0425*** 0.0595***
(0.0071) (0.0058) (0.00851)
Basement 0.110*** 0.109*** 0.143***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.00879)
Distance to Elementray School (1000ft) -0.00962*** -0.00716*** 0.00183
(0.00322) (0.00260) (0.00358)
Distance to Middle School (1000ft) 0.000646 -0.00184 -0.00258
(0.00321) (0.00251) (0.00198)
Distance to High School (1000ft) -0.00639** -0.00412 -0.00698***
(0.00310) (0.00260) (0.00176)
# of Charter Schools Within 1 Mile of Home -0.0101 -0.00876
(0.00644) (0.00846)
# of Private Schools Within 1 Mile of Home -0.00520 0.0169**
(0.00516) (0.00826)
Median Income by Census Tract ($1000's) 0.00461*** 0.00603***
(0.00042) (0.000765)
% Commercial Area within 1/8 mile of Elementary 0.0969
(0.137)
% Commercial Area within 1/8 mile of Middle -0.348***
(0.108)
% Commercial Area within 1/8 mile of High 0.371***
(0.114)
% Protected/Access Land within 1/8 mile of High -0.376***
(0.0963)
% of Students Proficient in R,W,M for Elementary 0.00373***
(0.000773)
% of Students Proficient in R,W,M for Middle -0.00125
(0.000758)
% of Students Proficient in R,W,M for High 0.00105
(0.000789)
Observations 22264 22264 19961
R-squared 0.826 0.836 0.759
Year and Quarter FE YES YES YES
School Boundary FE YES YES NO
Cluster Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Continuous Measure for Distance to Schooling Level
Table 23
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Column 1 is the most simplislict regression with no controls outside of housing characteristics and school 
boundaries. Results indicate a 1,000ft increase in the distance to an elementary school from the mean of 2,400ft, 
drops home prices by 1.0% and is statistically significant.  For middle schools, a 1,000ft increase in distance from 
the mean of 5,800ft, results in no significant impact to homes prices.  For high schools, a 1,000ft increase in 
distance from the mean of 8,500ft, drops home prices by 0.6% and is significant.  The result for middle schools is 
quite puzzling, possibly the use of distance dumies in the 2nd model will shed light on this outcome. 
Column 2 is the same as 1 but adds in outside schooling options and neighborhood income as controls.14  
The number of charter and private schools within a 1 mile radius are used as a measure for outside options 
residents face besides their location based public schooling. An increase in outside schooling options should lower 
the value placed on the residential school and hence the value for distance to that school. Median income by 
census tract is also used as a neighborhood control.  The addition of these controls results in the expected effect of 
lowering the value for distance to public schooling.  The value for elementray schools drops from 1.0% to 0.7% but 
maintains its signifigance. Middle school show very little change and continues to be insignificant. High school 
drops from 0.6% to 0.4% and its signifigance level is just above 10%. 
Column 3 drops school boundary fixed effects and instead uses school specific characteristics associated 
with the location and the quality of the school.  There is concern that the school location has other desirable land 
uses very nearby and so if these are not controled for, one may interpret the value for distance to schooling as just 
the value for these nearby desirable lands. Very often it seems there are commercial shopping areas located near 
high schools, and so the percentage of commercial land within a 1/8 mile buffer radius of schools is added as a 
control.15  The percentage proficient for the average of reading, writing, and math for each school is used as a 
                                                             
14 Since schooling boundaries are used as fixed effects, controls related to schools such as commercial land use 
near schools and net transfers of students between schools cannot be used.  The controls used in column 2 are the 
only additional controls not tied to public schooling boundaries. 
15
 There is concern that commercial land and town city centers are of value and often located near high schools.  
For this reason other buffer radii are investigated, ¼ and ½ mile radius are used and show very little change in 
results as compared to 1/8 mile.  Also, the study area is only the city of Denver and so high schools do not have the 
possibility of being located near a desirable town center. 
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proxy for quality, more students scoring proficient should indicate a higher quality school.16  Approximately 2,000 
homes were dropped from the sample as they were in school areas which had incomplete testing data for their 
students. 
Results for Column 3 are weak at best, dropping the school boundary fixed effects led to strange results 
for a few housing characteristics and distance to elementary schools. One possible explanation is that commercial 
land is often not located near elementary schools. Elementary schools are usually surrounded by residential 
neighborhoods and commercial areas with large amounts of traffic are not desirable near elementary schools.  
Elementary school boundaries are  a relatively small geographic level (1 to 2 square miles), where the most 
prevelant variation with a boundary could plausibly be the distance to elementary schooling, removing fixed 
effects at this level now makes comparison based on controls that are not relevant to the value for elementary 
location based schooling.17  Using test scores as a measure of quality appears to be met with mixed results, but for 
elementary schooling test scores are positive and significant indicating quality of schooling is quite important at 
this level. 
 The nice result from column 3 is for high schools. Since high schools are the fewest in number, 10, and 
have the largest area, school boundary fixed effects are less likely to be an important control. Also, commercial 
land is located more frequently next to high schools and so represents diserable land uses near a school that 
residences value living closer to. And since there are fewer high schools, test scores give a better indication of 
school quality. It comes as no surprise that the results for distance to, % commercial, and % open space for high 
school are significant and of the expected sign. While the % commercial land near a high school is valued 
positively, the coefficient for distance to high school has a value similar to the other column and retains statistical 
signifigance. 
 
                                                             
16 Controlling for school quality should make the distance to schooling variable smaller but higher in statistical 
significance.  Controlling for quality should give a more accurate estimate for the distance to schooling variables. 
17
 Also, there are several neighborhood characteristics that impact home value which are now not being controlled 
for.  Also, even if density, demographics and other controls are added it will still not adequately control for 
geographic based differences which affect home value. 
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Model 2: Dummies as Measure for Distance to Schooling  
 Table 24 shows the results of esimating the hedonic housing price equation using distance dummies as 
explanatory variables. There is concern that distance to schooling may not vary linearly and so dummies may give a 
better picture of the changing value over distance. The methodology and controls used for columns 1 thru 3 are 
the same for both models. The controls for each column perform similarly in sign and magnitude for model 2 
compared to model 1, which is expected, only the distance variables are changed which should have no 
qualatative impact on the controls. 
 Here the focus is on how the value for schooling changes with distance.  Figures 13b, 14b and 15b were 
used as guides to select the bins used for dummies.  At each school level the bin width was varied to have a similar 
number observations in each bin for each school level.  For example, elementary schools have a majority of 
observations within 5,000ft, where as for middle schools this majority is not reached until 13,000ft, this impacts 
the varying distance range of dummy bins between elementary and middle schools.  Also for each school level, 
each bin has approximately 3,000 observations, for elementary schools this number of observations occurs within 
500ft but for middle schools this doesn’t happen until 1,000ft.18 
 Table 24 while showing all the important results, has many numbers which hinders  analysis and so 
Figures 16a, 16b and 16c show column 2 distance dummy mean values and their 95% confidence intervals for each 
level of schooling.  Interesting to note when comparing these figures is that the very closest homes in the first bin 
of each graph are not valued the highest, this is most likely due to congestion and traffic near the schools. The 
homes further away (1000-15000ft) are still easily within walking distance but avoid the congestion near schools, 
these homes are valued relatively higher for all three schooling levels. Also, all three schooling levels have a 
relatively sharp decline in value for large distances near the end of each sample. Suprisingly, between the two 
distance extremes for each figure the graphs are relatively flat. This suggests that home owners desire being within 
1 mile of schooling but there is little difference in value from being 500ft or 1 mile from schooling. 
                                                             
18
 The exact bin width was arbitrary, as nice round distances are preferred over ones that break the sample into 
exactly equal numbers of observations.   
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VARIABLES log_saleprice log_saleprice log_saleprice
Elementary less than 500ft 0.0312* 0.0232* -0.00672
(0.0174) (0.0135) (0.0200)
Elementary 500-1000ft 0.0342* 0.0290** 0.00617
(0.0181) (0.0138) (0.0201)
Elementary 1000-1500ft 0.0246 0.0184 -0.00489
(0.0176) (0.0135) (0.0205)
Elementary 1500-2000ft 0.0340* 0.0260* -0.000615
(0.0174) (0.0137) (0.0210)
Elementary 2000-2500ft 0.0327* 0.0277* 0.0106
(0.0177) (0.0146) (0.0185)
Elementary 2500-3000ft 0.0260 0.0231 0.00999
(0.0178) (0.0156) (0.0184)
Elementary 3000-4000ft 0.0163 0.0180 0.0147
(0.0162) (0.0152) (0.0157)
Middle less than 1000ft 0.0289 0.0365 0.0178
(0.0399) (0.0310) (0.0319)
Middle 1000-2000ft 0.0467 0.0490 0.0423
(0.0382) (0.0306) (0.0267)
Middle 2000-3000ft 0.0502 0.0464 0.0483**
(0.0373) (0.0306) (0.0244)
Middle 3000-4000ft 0.0557 0.0438 0.0515**
(0.0348) (0.0283) (0.0238)
Middle 4000-5000ft 0.0693** 0.0527* 0.0746***
(0.0350) (0.0274) (0.0189)
Middle 5000-7000ft 0.0594* 0.0408 0.0852***
(0.0336) (0.0258) (0.0211)
Middle 7000-9000ft 0.0507 0.0301 0.0399*
(0.0320) (0.0234) (0.0214)
Middle 9000-11000ft 0.0180 0.00729 0.0165
(0.0234) (0.0184) (0.0218)
High less than 1000ft 0.0666* 0.0254 0.0916**
(0.0364) (0.0316) (0.0425)
High 1000-2000ft 0.0881*** 0.0681*** 0.132***
(0.0300) (0.0255) (0.0336)
High 2000-4000ft 0.0944*** 0.0662*** 0.151***
(0.0271) (0.0238) (0.0290)
High 4000-6000ft 0.107*** 0.0625*** 0.181***
(0.0245) (0.0227) (0.0262)
High 6000-8000ft 0.0897*** 0.0505** 0.182***
(0.0226) (0.0217) (0.0255)
High 8000-10000ft 0.0267 0.00768 0.124***
(0.0205) (0.0192) (0.0235)
High 10000-13000ft 0.00392 -0.00487 0.126***
(0.0179) (0.0166) (0.0301)
High 13000-16000ft -0.0192 -0.0216 0.0581*
(0.0173) (0.0141) (0.0328)
# of Charter Schools Within 1 Mile of Home -0.00911 -0.00138
(0.00625) (0.00806)
# of Private Schools Within 1 Mile of Home -0.00414 0.0112
(0.00568) (0.00694)
Median Income by Census Tract ($1000's) 0.00445*** 0.00586***
(0.000423) (0.000750)
% Commercial Area within 1/8 mile of Elementary 0.0641
(0.139)
% Commercial Area within 1/8 mile of Middle -0.303***
(0.114)
% Commercial Area within 1/8 mile of High 0.323***
(0.104)
% Protected/Access Land within 1/8 mile of High -0.366***
(0.0856)
% of Students Proficient in R,W,M for Elementary 0.00388***
(0.000732)
% of Students Proficient in R,W,M for Middle -0.00152**
(0.000703)
% of Students Proficient in R,W,M for High 0.00121
(0.000760)
Observations 22264 22264 19961
R-squared 0.828 0.837 0.768
Year and Quarter FE YES YES YES
Home Characteristic Controls YES YES YES
School Boundary FE YES YES NO
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Table 24
Dummies Measure for Distance to Schooling Level
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Figures 16a, 16b and 16c: Column 2 of Table 22 (Mean and 95% CI for Distance Dummies) 
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Robustness Check 
The school fixed effects in the previous regressions are unique catchment areas.  As previously mentioned 
this is due to collinearity issues and also may be the most appropriate level to control for differences in school 
quality tied to a home location.  There is also a concern that the catchment areas are too small, these areas are 
essentially elementary school boundaries, plus a few unique areas that are created when middle and high school 
boundaries cross an elementary boundary.  The small size of the catchment areas give rise to suspicion that there 
may not be large enough differences in distance to middle and high schools within a catchment area to properly 
identify and estimate their parameters.   
As a check this section estimates the parameters on distance to schooling by having a separate regression 
for each schooling level.  This allows the fixed effect in each school level regression to be the school boundaries as 
seen in Figures 13a, 14a, and 15a without issues of collinearity.  Also, this makes comparisons of distance on a 
much larger scale for middle and high schools which is possibly a more appropriate manner in which to estimate 
their parameters.  Table 25 and 26  show estimates for continuous and discrete distance measures respectively for 
each school level.  Each column in Tables 25 and 26 estimates the same parameters as Column 2 from Tables 23 
and 24. 
Table 25 and 26 return similar coefficients to Column 2 for Table 23 and 24 for distance to schooling on all 
levels.  This result alleviates concerns about estimating the parameters for distance to middle and high schools for 
Tables 23 and 24. 
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VARIABLES
log_saleprice 
(elementary)
log_saleprice 
(middle)
log_saleprice 
(high)
Ln of Lot Size (acres) 0.0834*** 0.0455*** 0.0362**
(0.0105) (0.0140) (0.0161)
# of Baths 0.0754*** 0.0819*** 0.0785***
(0.00428) (0.00459) (0.00438)
Ln of Home Size (sqft) 0.415*** 0.436*** 0.454***
(0.0140) (0.0182) (0.0168)
Age of House (years) -0.000474** 0.000174 7.82e-05
(0.000230) (0.000277) (0.000285)
Garage Attached to Home 0.00990* -0.000212 -0.00387
(0.00553) (0.00802) (0.00723)
A/C in Home -0.0231** -0.0276*** -0.0291***
(0.00897) (0.00892) (0.00939)
Fireplace 0.0455*** 0.0607*** 0.0579***
(0.00647) (0.00849) (0.00819)
Basement 0.113*** 0.134*** 0.128***
(0.00594) (0.00917) (0.00782)
Distance to Elementray School (1000ft) -0.00734***
(0.00272)
Distance to Middle School (1000ft) -0.000505
(0.00186)
Distance to High School (1000ft) -0.00544***
(0.00129)
# of Charter Schools Within 1 Mile of Home -0.0148* -0.0268*** -0.00584
(0.00767) (0.00847) (0.00670)
# of Private Schools Within 1 Mile of Home -0.00444 0.00572 0.0160***
(0.00543) (0.00666) (0.00585)
Median Income by Census Tract ($1000's) 0.00444*** 0.00601*** 0.00660***
(0.000435) (0.000561) (0.000469)
Observations 22264 22264 22264
R-squared 0.829 0.802 0.803
Year and Quarter FE YES YES YES
School Boundary FE YES YES YES
Cluster Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Table 25
Continuous Measure for Distance to Schooling Level in Separate Regressions
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VARIABLES
log_saleprice 
(elementary)
log_saleprice 
(middle)
log_saleprice 
(high)
Elementary less than 500ft 0.0377**
(0.0149)
Elementary 500-1000ft 0.0439***
(0.0151)
Elementary 1000-1500ft 0.0340**
(0.0149)
Elementary 1500-2000ft 0.0417***
(0.0151)
Elementary 2000-2500ft 0.0432***
(0.0158)
Elementary 2500-3000ft 0.0382**
(0.0167)
Elementary 3000-4000ft 0.0300*
(0.0154)
Middle less than 1000ft 0.00359
(0.0319)
Middle 1000-2000ft 0.0236
(0.0294)
Middle 2000-3000ft 0.0103
(0.0301)
Middle 3000-4000ft 0.000661
(0.0283)
Middle 4000-5000ft 0.00787
(0.0283)
Middle 5000-7000ft -0.00225
(0.0282)
Middle 7000-9000ft -0.0181
(0.0291)
Middle 9000-11000ft -0.0105
(0.0245)
High less than 1000ft 0.0394
(0.0242)
High 1000-2000ft 0.0809***
(0.0196)
High 2000-4000ft 0.0811***
(0.0173)
High 4000-6000ft 0.0752***
(0.0175)
High 6000-8000ft 0.0572***
(0.0206)
High 8000-10000ft 0.0188
(0.0242)
High 10000-13000ft -0.00694
(0.0230)
High 13000-16000ft -0.0247
(0.0257)
# of Charter Schools Within 1 Mile of Home -0.0151** -0.0288*** -0.00604
(0.00754) (0.00865) (0.00617)
# of Private Schools Within 1 Mile of Home -0.00371 0.00607 0.0155***
(0.00545) (0.00656) (0.00593)
Median Income by Census Tract ($1000's) 0.00443*** 0.00599*** 0.00646***
(0.000436) (0.000543) (0.000470)
Observations 22264 22264 22264
R-squared 0.829 0.802 0.805
Year and Quarter FE YES YES YES
Home Characteristic Controls YES YES YES
School Boundary FE YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Table 26
Dummies Measure for Distance to Schooling Level in Separate Regressions
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Conclusion 
This paper uses hedonic analysis of home transactions in the Denver Public School District to estimate the 
effect of distance to schooling on sales price.  This study considers all three levels of public location based 
schooling: elementary, middle and high school. While most studies on schooling and home prices investigate the 
change in home value based on quality of schooling, this paper attempts to control for school quality differences 
and focus on the value for distance to schooling.  School boundary fixed effects are used to control for differences 
in school quality and neighborhood characteristics tied to residential location.   
The results yield several important insights. First, in a general sense, as distance to schooling increases, 
home prices decrease, this is the expected result. Results using a continuous distance measure indicate that for 
elementary and high schools every 1000ft increase in distance to schooling leads to homes prices dropping 
between 0.5% and 1.0%.  Interestingly, distance to middle schools has no significant impact. However, results using 
distance dummies instead of a continuous measure indicate the value for distance to schooling may not be linear 
which in some part explains the result for middle schools. 
Second, distance dummy results indicate that homes very close to schooling, less than 500ft, are valued 
less than homes 1000-1500ft away.  This result indicates a nuisance or congestion effect very close to schools that 
is undesirable. Distance dummy results also indicate that homeowners have similar values for being just outside 
this congestion zone as being 1 mile from a school.  When homes are more than 1 mile from schooling, distance 
increases have a larger impact on decreasing home prices.  Taken together these results indicate homeowners 
value living within walking distance of a school. 
Finally, outside schooling options and desirable lands near schools have an impact on the value of 
housing. While outside schooling options like charter and private schools near a home were used as controls, 
results suggest more outside options decrease the value for public location based schooling areas and thus the 
distance to schooling. Also, shopping areas are quite prevalent near high schools; results indicate that 
homeowners value proximity to these commercial lands. Controlling for commercial land near high schools lowers 
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the value for distance to high schools as expected, but it still retains significance indicating it is just not the 
proximity to shopping centers that is valued. 
These results have some common sense policy implications.  Since homeowners value being closer to 
schooling and have large drops in value at distances greater than a mile, it makes sense to have a school located in 
the middle of its boundary area.  Minimizing the average distance to a school for a boundary area should maximize 
the value of the homes in its boundary as it relates to the value for distance to schooling.  This study also 
contributes to the literature on home prices reflecting school quality differences.  Several recent studies use 
nearest neighbor matching techniques for homes across school boundaries to estimate the value for school 
quality.  This study indicates that home prices drop as distance to schooling increases, so matching estimators 
need to account for distance to schooling that would likely be discontinuous across a school boundary.  For 
example two homes are located close to each other across school boundary lines; one home is 1000ft from its 
school while the other home is 7000ft from its school.  The difference in home price seen may not be attributable 
to school quality difference but instead due to the difference in distance to schooling.     
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